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IRAN’S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES 
Alan Salehzadeh* 
 
Iran has a reputation of being a problematic country. Right now, it is proceeding 
with its nuclear program despite the opposition of the West and neighboring 
countries and the massive sanctions inflicted upon it. The country is also strug-
gling with domestic issues. Half of Iran’s population belongs to different ethnic 
or religious minorities. They have poor rights to express their culture in the coun-
try, which is a cause of dissatisfaction among non-Shiite and non-Persian citi-
zens. After the Arab Spring, the situation in Iran is getting more topical than 
ever. In the Syrian conflict, the Shiite Iran is constantly giving support to al-
Assad’s regime. These are all factors that have aggravated the already irritated re-
lations between Iran and the West.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
What is nowadays known as Iran was part 
of the Persian Empire until 1935, when the 
Empire collapsed and was divided into sev-
eral different countries. For many years af-
ter the Persian Empire collapsed Iran was a 
secular country, where women dressed as 
they pleased and both genders mingled 
freely. Things changed when the West-
minded Shah was overthrown and forced 
into exile in 1979. 
The Shah was an autocrat, and ruled 
the country by himself. He maintained good 
relations with the West, especially with the 
United States. That is why he was accused 
of placing Western needs prior to those of 
his own people.  
This wasn’t the only reason why the 
Iranians were unhappy with him. Under the 
Shah’s regime, the rights of different eth-
nicities and political groups were trampled 
on. Political Islam was forbidden. The local 
intelligence service and the army had major 
roles in running the society. Secular people, 
leftists, different ethnic minorities, liberals 
and religious people all suffered under the 
Shah and were unhappy under his restrict-
ing regime. Iran was torn with political and 
economic problems, and the people wanted 
desperately for things to change. So they re-
volted, and finally it led to the Shah being 
overthrown and forced into exile in 1979.  
However, things did not change for the 
good – quite the opposite. When the regime 
changed, the political situation became 
more and more tense, as the new regime 
started to rule with terror, cutting down civ-
il rights and adopting a hostile attitude to-
wards most foreign nations.  
Now Iran is widely thought to pose a 
threat to its surrounding countries, Israel, 
and the rest of the world. Iran is known to 
support terrorist organizations and causes 
great concern with its urge to build a nu-
clear weapon. The human rights conditions 
are in a very bad state according to many in-
ternational sources, and the relations with 
most foreign nations are currently strained.  
The purpose of this research is to analyze 
the current situation of Iran and to present 
possible scenarios that may happen. I will 
focus i.a. on the country’s domestic policy, 
the relations Iran has with its neighboring 
countries and some other key nations, and 
the nuclear question. 
But first we contemplate the principles 
on which the Islamic Republic of Iran lies.  
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1 The Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
1.1 Principles and Practice  
 
In this chapter, the system of government 
that was established in Iran in 1979, is brief-
ly presented. What principles is it founded 
on, and how does it operate? 
Below are listed the “seven essential 
elements” of democracy, as adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in their resolution 
dating from 20041: 
 
- Separation and balance of power  
- Independence of the judiciary 
- A pluralistic system of political parties 
and organizations 
- Respect for the rule of law  
- Accountability and transparency 
- Free, independent and pluralistic media 
- Respect for human and political rights; 
e.g., freedoms of association and expres-
sion; the right to vote and to stand in 
elections 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran does not fol-
low these criteria. The ruling principles, in-
cluding legislation, constitution, system of 
government and practices of Iran strongly 
differ from the UN’s principles listed above.  
The country cannot be thought of as 
a democratic republic, even though the Su-
preme Leader tries to convince the opposite 
– it is a theocratic republic. In a theocratic re-
public, power is thought to belong to God 
and His representatives. In Iran, the Su-
preme Leader is Ali Hosseini Khamenei, 
                                                 
                                                
* Alan Salehzadeh has previously worked in differ-
ent universities as a researcher and lecturer. Before 
that, he worked in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland. Currently he works as a researcher at the 
National Defence University, in the Department of 
Strategic and Defence Studies. 
1 Meyer Michael, “International Consensus: Essen-
tial elements of democracy”, 2007,  
[http://www.democracyreporting.org/files/essentia
l_elements_of_democracy_2.pdf]. 
also referred to as Ayatollah Khamenei.2 
Religious organs and institutions have the 
highest power of decision. The Supreme 
Leader’s power is spread across the 
branches of government and he has final 
say in all matters.  
Ayatollah Khamenei has direct control 
over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGS). It has a parallel army, navy 
and air force which are explicitly loyal to the 
revolutionary regime and answers directly to 
Ayatollah Khamenei. IRGS’s commanders 
are key military figures. Khamenei has given 
them a lot of power over the country’s 
economy, allowing them to run everything 
from oil pipelines to construction projects 
and Tehran's main airport.3 
The Islamic Republic of Iran maintains 
religious laws and has religious courts to in-
terpret all aspects of law. The Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran advances the 
cultural, social, political, and economic insti-
tutions of Iranian society based on Islamic 
principles and norms. All official decision 
must be in accordance with the Koran and 
Islamic laws.4  
Iran’s theocratic system and domestic 
policy form in fact, an extremely complex 
system. However, to understand how the 
system of government works, it is sufficient 
to know that the Supreme Religious Leader 
Ali Khamenei is the only ruler, together 
with his closest inner circle called Beite Ra-
hbari.5 Beite Rahbari consists of clerics and 
 
2 The office of the Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Kha-
menei, 1 July 2013,  
[http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/] 
3 Article 91 of the Constitution establishes all the  
power granted to the Spiritual Leader appointed by 
his peers for an unlimited duration.  
4 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,  
Article 91, 17 February 2010, [http://www.imj.ir/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
583:1388-11-17-15-39-46&catid=84:1388-11-03-08-
40-10&Itemid=222].  
5 Beite Rahbari is formed by influential people, the 
inner circle of Khamenei, who are involved in 
decision-making 3 July 2010, [http://www.pey- 
keiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=19544].  
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soldiers, who have especially been desig-
nated to protect the clerical members of 
Beite Rahbari. The exact number of clerics 
belonging to Beite Rahbari is a close-kept 
secret, and no one knows their actual num-
ber. There are at least dozens of them, all 
personally chosen by Ali Khamenei. Ali 
Khamenei and his Beite Rahbari group have 
all power upon Iran’s domestic and foreign 
policies. 
Nonetheless, there are dozens of dif-
ferent political parties in Iran. Their role is 
to give a pseudo-impression of democracy 
to the people and foreign observers. How-
ever, all political parties must act in accor-
dance with the Islamic laws. Thus, there is 
no real difference between them, and they 
differ mainly in the degree of intensity they 
interpret the Islamic laws. For the people, 
elections are like having to choose what to 
eat from different-colored eggs. Whichever 
you choose, you are still going to have an 
omelet.  
In Iran, Ali Khamenei and Beite Ra-
hbari have divided power to different elite 
Islamic groups, such as The Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC), The Islamic Republic 
of Iran Army (IRIA), the intelligence ser-
vices and the Basij (a paramilitary volunteer 
militia). This is also an attempt to show that 
power is divided – in fact, all important de-
cisions are made by Khamenei alone. 
Among these groups that are Khamenei’s 
subordinates, a fierce battle on money and 
oil income is taking place, each wanting 
more power than the other group has.6  All 
of the subordinate groups want to preserve 
the current Islamic ruling system in the 
country – all together Ali Khamenei and the 
subordinate groups are like a ship; if one 
piece breaks, they will all go down and sink. 
Thus, it is in the interest of all the organs 
that have access to some kind of power, to 
                                                 
                                                
6 Al-Monitor “Iran’s Basij Militia Builds' Resistance 
Economy', 19 March.2013, [http://www.al-moni- 
tor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/iran-basij-militia-
combat-sanctions-resistance-economy.html]. 
maintain the current political, un-
democratic system. This make it even more 
hard for the people to try and change 
things.  
 
1.2 Iranians Want Democracy  
 
When Iranians initiated the revolution in 
1979, their main wish was for a democratic 
regime to be installed in the country. How-
ever, at that time, religious groups within 
the country were better organized than any-
one else. Some say that they took advantage 
of the power of religion to turn uneducated 
people to support their ideology. They 
maintained rhetoric where democracy and 
freedom were promised, and so they were 
able to widely gain the support of the peo-
ple. The actual revolution itself had been 
started and carried through by leftist, liberal 
and secular groups, but now they found 
themselves excluded from any real power as 
religious groups took over. However, Islam-
ist groups, led by Khomeini, promised to 
the nation the same things they were after: 
democracy and freedom for all. In the first 
election after Shah was overthrown, 98% 
voted for the Islamic republic, and so 
Khomeini stepped into power.7  
After Khomeini took power, the prom-
ises given to the people were unfulfilled. He 
started almost immediately to rule with ter-
ror, executing those who opposed him. Is-
lamists established the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, abolished non-Islamic political parties, 
captured and executed people who wanted 
democracy. They have been ruling the 
country in an autocrat way ever since.   
Iranians have widely protested against their 
rulers.8 The government has answered by 
capturing and killing dissidents. It can be 
 
7 Press-TV, ”Iran marks Islamic Republic Day”,  
1 April.2013, [http://www.presstv.com/detail/  
2013/04/01/295997/iran-marks-islamic-republic-
day/]. 
8 Daly Brendan, ” Regime Change in Iran?”, Middle 
East Quarterly, Spring 2012, pp. 81–86,   
[http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3225.pdf]. 
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said that the vast majority of Iranians want 
things to change, but all the attempts they 
have made to try to implement a democratic 
government have been in vain so far.9   
 
2 The Iranian Political Scene  
 
In Iran the political scene can be divided 
into reformists and conservatives. However, 
all parties, no matter the side, must obey the 
Islamic rules. Thus, there are many similari-
ties between the two sides.   
First of all, both are under the subor-
dination of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, 
they do not have any real power of their 
own, and they cannot act in discordance 
with principles set by Khamenei. Secondly, 
both groups want to act according to the 
Iranian legislation and to maintain and pro-
tect the principles of the Islamic Republic. 
Thirdly, both groups want to limit the de-
gree of freedom of the people. Fourthly, 
neither of these two political groups pro-
motes equality and rights of different op-
pressed groups like women, ethnic or reli-
gious minorities and different sexual mi-
norities. Fifthly, neither accepts the exis-
tence of Israel, and both groups wish for 
Iran to continue develop nuclear weapons. 
Sixthly, whether it was under the govern-
ment of the conservatives or the reformists, 
Iran supported different Islamic organiza-
tions worldwide, and neither of the groups 
have been able to challenge or change the 
domestic and foreign policies set by the Su-
preme Leader.    
Ever since the founding of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, there has been this dual 
division in the political system. These par-
ties operate inside the Islamic regime; the 
conservatives are religious extremist and 
members of ultra-religious right-wing par-
                                                 
                                                
9 Farwick Dieter, ” Iran's Ex-President Banisadr:  
"People want Regime Change", 18 February 2010,  
[http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Iran/diete
r-farwick-1/Irans-Ex-President-Banisadr-People-
want-Regime-Change]. 
ties, while the reformists are moderately re-
ligious members of right-wing parties.  
The reformist and conservative parties 
of Iran have been subjects of a lot of politi-
cal analysis. Most of the experts on Iran’s 
political system agree that the Iranian politi-
cal system is clearly divided into these two 
distinct political camps. However, there are 
other researchers that argue, quite accu-
rately, that no matter which side the ruler 
claims to belong, Iran is in fact always gov-
erned by clerics, who follow the Shiite Is-
lamic principles. 
In the following chapter, this latter 
point-of-view is further explained.  
 
2.1 Conservatives and Reformists 
 
Reformists can win the election when the 
Supreme Leader allows it. This happens in 
situations where the national economy is 
plummeting or the foreign or domestic pol-
icy of the country is in a situation of crisis. 
For instance, when the most famous re-
formist Mohammad Khatami was elected 
president in 1997, Iran was facing grave dif-
ficulties economically, in its domestic af-
fairs, and with its relations with other coun-
tries.  
When Mohammad Khatami became 
president in 1997, the relation between the 
EU and Iran were in a really bad state. In 
fact, all relations were stopped. This was 
due to the fact that in 1997, Iranian authori-
ties were guilty of murdering a Kurdish op-
position leader in Germany. After this was 
found out, the EU countries cut all diplo-
matic relations with the country, and shortly 
after Khatami became president.10  
 
10 In the findings of the Superior Court of Justice in  
Berlin in the so-called Mykonos case, the 
involvement of the Iranian authorities at the highest 
level was established. The European Union 
condemned this involvement of the Iranian 
authorities and regarded such behavior as totally 
unacceptable. 
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_dat
a/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/032E.htm].  
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In Iran, not everyone can pose as a candi-
date for the presidential elections. It is the 
Guardian Council of the Constitution11 that 
elects who is a suitable candidate, following 
strict criteria dictated by the Supreme 
Leader. The election of Khatami in this 
critical situation was carefully planned in 
advance.  
Nonetheless, the golden ruling period 
of the reformists was under Mohammad 
Khatami’s period between 1997 and 2005. 
Under his regime, Iran was able to enhance 
its economic situation and diplomatic rela-
tions, and suggested to open a “dialogue 
among civilizations and cultures” in the 
UN. In 2000, following Iran’s initiative, the 
UN named the 5th of September to be the 
Day of Dialogue Among Civilizations.12 All of 
this was actually a way to keep everyone 
happy and thus extend the existence of the 
Islamic Republic. All the reforms Khatami 
made were submitted to the control and re-
strictions of the Supreme Leader.13 In the 
end of his 8-year leading period, Khatami 
himself stated that his role was to be the 
right hand of the Supreme Leader, and that 
he had no possibilities to act beyond the 
will of Khamenei.14 
                                                 
                                                                           
11 The Guardian Council of the Constitution: The 
12-member Council of Guardians is one of the 
most powerful, unelected institutions in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The supreme leader appoints six 
clerical members. The head of the judiciary, on 
advice of parliament, appoints six lay members. All 
12 members are appointed to six-year terms. The 
Guardian Council of the Constitution, 6 August  
2013, [http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/Home/].  
12 Unesco, “Round Table: Dialogue among Civiliza- 
tions United Nations, New York, 5 September 2000 
Provisional verbatim transcription”, 2000, [http:// 
www.unesco.org/dialogue/en/khatami.htm].  
13 Fisher Max, “How do Iran’s supreme leader and 
president split power? Here’s a chart explaining it”, 
Washington post, 14 June 2013, [http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/1
4/how-do-irans-supreme-leader-and-president-split-
power-heres-a-chart-explaining-it/]. 
14  The Florida Times Union, “Khatami Says He is 
Powerless Hard-Liners Rule, Iran's President Says”, 
[http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-
In August 2013, another reformist 
president was sworn in – Hassan Rouhani.15 
The reasons behind his election are largely 
similar to the ones behind Khatami’s. Rou-
hani is now perceived as the savior of the 
Islamic Republic, who is going to re-
establish good relations with neighboring 
countries and the West, reflate the economy 
and prevent large protests and the Arab 
spring to spread to Iran.  
According to his own speeches, Rou-
hani is prepared to follow the laws of the Is-
lamic Republic, and act as a subordinate of 
the Supreme Leader. He has also stated that 
Iran has the right to enrich uranium, but 
that the country is ready to solve the dis-
agreement over nuclear weapons in a peace-
ful manner with the West.16 According to 
Rouhani, Iran’s policy towards Syria will not 
change under his regime, and Iran has the 
duty and obligation to support Bashar al-
Assad under all circumstances.17 This shows 
that even though Rouhani belongs to the 
reformist side, in all the critical aspects he is 
ready to agree with the previous, conserva-
tive government. This is why some re-
searchers feel that Iran is always ruled by 
Shiites, loyal to Khamenei. The entire sys-
tem is built in a way that it does not allow 
any real political dissidence.  
 
 
67386539/khatami-says-he-s-powerless-hard-liners-
rule-iran-s].   
15 Kamali Dehghan Saeed, “Hassan Rouhani sworn 
in as president of Iran, urging moderation and 
respect”, The Guardian 4 August 2013,  
[http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/04
/hassan-rouhani-sworn-in-president-iran]. 
16 Fars-News, “President Rouhani: No Compromise 
over Iran’s N. Enrichment Right”, 6 August 2013, 
[President Rouhani: No Compromise over Iran’s N. 
Enrichment Right]. 
17 Dubowits Mark and Badran Tony, “Iran's 
'Moderate' New President Still Supports Assad”, The 
Antlantic 5 August 2013, [http://www.theat- 
lantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/irans-
moderate-new-president-still-supports-assad/ 
278361/].  
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2.2 The Opposition 
 
Since there are no real differences between 
conservatives and reformists, it is important 
to stop for a while to analyze the role of the 
opposition. 
For opposition groups, it is impossible 
to work within Iran, since it is strictly for-
bidden by the system. The only opposition 
group that has operated inside the country 
is the Green Movement, which now has 
been repressed, too.  
All the Iranian opposition groups work 
from abroad. Most of them have their 
headquarters in Europe or the United 
States. There are dozens of this kind of op-
position groups that represent all sorts of 
political goals: leftist, communist, pro-
monarchy, minority political parties… 
These maintain institutes and organizations 
that all share a goal; to change the regime. 
However, they lack a common front, since 
the different opposition groups do not col-
laborate with each other.  
The most powerful opposition groups 
are the People's Mujahedin of Iran (or the 
Mojahedin-e-Khalq) and some minority po-
litical parties. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq head-
quarters are located in the Iraqi side of the 
Iran-Iraq border. These opposition groups 
fight the government actively and are en-
gaged to armed confrontation with the cen-
tral government forces. The rest of the op-
position groups operate only through Inter-
net and the media, but only few of them 
take action to change the regime.  
Some of these opposition groups 
would like the help of the international 
community to overthrow the government, 
while others do not want outside interfer-
ence out of fear that Iran becomes divided 
into several smaller nations in a process 
called Balkanization.  
 
2.2.1 Iranians Have Massively Protested Against  
        Their Government 
 
It is not possible for the Iranians to change 
their regime democratically through elec-
tions. Since the founding of the Islamic Re-
public, they have tried everything possible 
to change the theocratic system into a de-
mocratic one – without ever succeeding in 
their attempts. Since the revolution of 1979, 
Iranians have tried in a peaceful manner to 
urge the rulers to fulfill their demands for a 
democratic system to be formed. The au-
thorities have been answering to these de-
mands by captivating and executing people.  
After the government had many times 
violently suppressed the risings and de-
mands of the people, different political 
groups tried to overthrow the government 
by using guns and arms in the late 1990’s. 
Once again, the Iranian regime was able to 
suppress the democratic urges coming from 
the people and to disperse the armed 
groups. Iranians did not give up. Every time 
a new chance to demonstrate and protest 
against the regime appeared, the Iranians 
seized it.18  
In June 2009, mass demonstrations 
erupted in Iran against the officially de-
clared victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
The demonstrators felt the election had 
been fraudulent. Thousands of protesters 
marched in Tehran chanting their slogan 
"Where Is My Vote?”.19 These protests are 
now viewed as having started the Green 
Movement.  
                                                 
18 Ellian Afshin, ” Iranians Want Regime Change”, 
The Wall Street Journal 30 December 2009,  
[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748
703510304574625713733452476.html]. 
19 F. Worth Robert & Fatahi Nazila, “Protests Flare 
in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote”, The New 
York Times 13 June 2013, [http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html?p
agewanted=all&_r=0]. 
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2.2.2 The Green Movement 
 
Green Movement is the name of the Iranian 
protest movement, which started when 
Ahmedinejad was re-elected for presidency 
in 2009. Although the Green Movement is a 
real protest movement, a certain paradox 
remains.  
Even though most of the participants 
of the Green Movement really want a de-
mocratic system instead of a theocratic one, 
the leaders of the movement are firmly a 
part of the ruling system: Mir-Hossein 
Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubui, both cur-
rently in house-arrest, were candidates and 
rivals of Ahmedinejad in the election of 
2009.20 Knowing that all the candidates are 
carefully selected by the Supreme Leader 
Khamenei, these two man couldn’t be any-
thing else than supporters of the system. 
Under Ahmadinejad’s first government, 
both of these men had high-ranking posi-
tions in the parliament. They became the 
leaders of the Green Movement because 
they were unsatisfied with the election’s re-
sult, having hoped to become presidents 
themselves.  
The people, on the other hand, needed 
someone powerful to be their mouthpiece 
against the current conditions.21 So even 
though the people knew these two man 
were part of the system, they accepted them 
as the leaders of the movement for protec-
tion and because it made it possible for 
them to demonstrate against the re-election 
of Ahmadinejad.  
In February 2010, protesters tried to 
organize an event in the support of the 
Arab uprising, but they were brutally sup-
pressed, the Iranian authorities killing many. 
                                                 
                                                
20 BBC-News, “Iran: Mir Hossein Mousavi and 
Mehdi Karroubi 'arrested”, 28 February 2011,  
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
12599837].  
21   Ellian Afshin, ” Iranians Want Regime Change”, 
The Wall Street Journal 30 December 2009,  
[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748
703510304574625713733452476.html]. 
From that day, the Green Movement was 
abolished and it went underground. In Iran 
it would not have been possible to demon-
strate unless part of a really large group of 
people called upon by someone powerful, 
because the government will not hesitate to 
open fire. Although the government did 
open fire during the Green Movement’s 
protests, the people anyway considered it 
safer than protesting separately. Eventually, 
the Iranian authorities suppressed the pro-
tests violently and imprisoned the activists 
of the group in a brutal manner. 
In 2013, the Green Movement was 
showing light support to Rouhani, who 
eventually won the presidential election. 
The movement’s supporters are satisfied 
their candidate got through, and the election 
wasn’t fraudulent. Many researchers feel 
that the reason no fraud took place is that it 
was also the current leaders’ wish for Rou-
hani to be elected; it was a strategic decision 
from the Supreme Leader. 
Some political experts view Hassan 
Rouhani to be to Iran what Mikhail Gor-
batšov22 was to the Soviet Union – some-
one who can renew the system politically 
and economically. However, there are also 
many that are opposed to this outlook. 
They – quite accurately – claim that Rouha-
ni couldn’t step in those shoes, since he 
does not have reformist ideas or urges, and 
because all real power ultimately lies in the 
hands of Khamenei.  
A common view among experts on 
Iranian politics is that the Green Movement 
would have been able to change Iran’s cur-
rent political system if the international 
community would have supported it. The 
Green Movement asked for international 
help to stop the government using force 
against the protesters, but the international 
community did not want to interfere, and 
 
22 Mikhail Gorbatšov was the starter of the Perest-
roika. The Perestroika was a process in the Soviet 
Union that aimed to renew the political and 
economic system of the USSR. 
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that is the main reason why the government 
was able to suppress the movement.23 
 
3 Minorities in Iran 
 
Iran is home to approximately 80 million 
people who are ethnically, religiously, and 
linguistically diverse. Almost half of the 
population belong to ethnic minority 
groups, such as Turks, Kurds, Balochs, 
Turkmen, Arabs, Armenians and so on. The 
majority of the population is ethnically Per-
sian and religiously Shiite Muslim. The only 
official language in Iran is Persian, despite it 
being the native tongue of roughly only half 
of the population. Arabic and English are 
widely taught in schools, but the use of the 
minorities’ native tongue in official con-
texts, such as schooling, university studies, 
or litigations, is forbidden.  
The rights of all minorities are severely 
trampled on in Iran, which has caused 
problems inside the country and to some 
extent, in its foreign relations as well. For 
this reason, it is important to contemplate 
the situation with the minorities. 
 
3.1 Ethnic Minorities 
In Table 1, we see the ethnic minorities of 
the country as reported by the CIA.24 
 
Persian 61% Azeri 16% 
Kurd 10% Lur 6% 
Baloch 2% Arab 2% 
Turkmen2% Other 1% 
 
Table 1: Iranian ethnic groups.  
                                                 
                                                
23 Esfandiari Golnaz, “What Does Iran's Green  
Movement Want From Obama?”, Radio Free Europe  
6 December 2009, [http://www.rferl.org/  
content/What_Does_Irans_Green_Movement_ 
Want_From_Obama_/1871445.html]. 
24 Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook, 
18 July 2013, [https://www.cia.gov/library/public-
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html].    
Some sources claim the percentage of Per-
sians to be lower than the 61% here pre-
sented. Usually it has been agreed that 
around 50% of the population is formed by 
ethnic minorities, and the rest are ethnic 
Persians.25 
In Iran, minorities do not have the right to 
speak their native tongue in an official con-
text or to express their culture in public. 
The article 15 of the Constitution of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran states that  
 
The use of regional and tribal languages in the 
press and mass media, as well as for teaching 
of their literature in schools, is allowed in ad-
dition to Persian.  
 
However, the same article of the Constitu-
tion also clearly defines that Persian is the 
only official language of Iran26: “Official 
documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as 
text-books, must be in this language and script”. 
 
In practice, the teaching of minority lan-
guages must be conducted in secret. There 
are also some magazines that are published 
in minority languages, but they are sub-
jected to severe supervision, as all media in 
Iran.  
The authorities in Iran think that if 
civil rights are given to ethnic minorities, 
the country will become divided and lose its 
unity. However, it is usually in countries like 
this that the minorities are fighting more 
forcefully to gain some degree of independ-
ence. The harder Iran is restricting the mi-
 
25 Bolhari Roozbeh and Najibullah Farangis, “Iran's  
Presidential Candidates Play The Ethnic-Minority 
Card”, Radio Free Europe 13 September 2013,  
[http://www.rferl.org/content/Irans_Presidential_
Candidates_Play_The_EthnicMinority_Card/17494
61.html]. 
26 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
8 July 2013, [http://www.imj.ir/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=583:1388-11-17-15 
-39-46&catid=84:1388-11-03-08-40-10&Itemid= 
222] & [http://www.alaviandassociates.com/docu-
ments/constitution.pdf]. 
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norities’ rights, the more opposed the mi-
norities become to the central government. 
At the moment, there are thousands of mi-
nority activists imprisoned for having de-
manded the right to teach their native 
tongue and to practice their culture freely.  
The international pressures on Iran to deal 
with its ethnic minority issues, becomes 
more and more severe as days pass. The po-
litical parties of the ethnic minorities, now 
in exile, are in a state of alert just waiting for 
the right moment to conquer their territo-
ries. If the Islamic Republic of Iran is not 
ready to accept the civil rights of the mi-
norities, it is very likely that the country will 
break into smaller territories, in a process 
called Balkanization.  
 
3.1.1 The Different Ethnicities of Iran  
 
Iran’s minorities have dozens of political 
parties to represent themselves. They are all 
living and working abroad in exile, since in 
Iran, it is forbidden for minorities to start 
political parties or other form of activism.  
The political goals of these parties dif-
fer widely. Some want to gain independence 
for the territory they occupy in Iran, while 
others want to form a self-government in-
side the country. The different parties work 
together, but they have no common front. 
In the following, the exigencies of the dif-
ferent ethnic minorities of Iran are pre-
sented.  
 
3.1.2 Iranian Turks  
Azeris or Turks are the largest ethnic mi-
nority of Iran. Religiously they are Shiite 
Muslims. The Turks of Iran (Azeris) formed 
an independent country, Azerbaijan, in 1946 
(back then, the country that is now known 
as Azerbaijan was a part of the Soviet Un-
ion). The Azerbaijan formed by the Iranian 
Azeris existed for about one year, before 
the Iranian army conquered back the terri-
tory and destroyed their republic. After this 
episode, the Azeris have been peacefully 
cohabiting with the Persians.  
Ever since the revolution of 1979, the 
Azeris have maintained close collaboration 
with the Islamic regime. Even though Turk-
ish and Persian are 100% different lan-
guages, the fact that both groups are Shiite 
Muslims have brought them close to each 
other. Many of the influential people of 
modern Iran are in fact Azeris, not Persians, 
like the Supreme Leader Khamenei himself.  
During the last decade, however, the Azeris 
have been increasingly demanding the rights 
to use their language and manifest their cul-
ture publicly. They have protested several 
times against the government. As a result, 
dozens of Azeri activists have been impris-
oned. 
Outside Iran, the Azeris have dozens 
of political parties. They have different 
goals and aspirations. Some want to form 
an independent Azerbaijan county, while 
others want to have a self-governed region 
within the country. Others want Iran to be-
come a democratic state, where they would 
have all the rights same as the majority of 
the population. Neighboring countries Tur-
key and Azerbaijan have actively supported 
some of the exiled Azeri parties, with the 
hope to promote Pan-Turkish ideology.27 
This has worsened the relations between 
Iran and these two neighbors. In the part 
“7.5 Iran and Azerbaijan”, the relations of 
these countries are further explained.  
 
3.1.3 Kurds 
 
All in all, Kurds form a population of 40 
million, with their own distinct culture and 
language. The Kurds live on a stretch of 
land divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria. In the aftermath of the First World 
                                                 
27 Today’s Zaman, “Iranian Azeris set up national  
council in Turkey, aspire for independence”, 14 May 
2012, [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-280353 
-iranian-azeris-set-up-national-council-in-turkey-
aspire-for-independence.html].  
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War, the winner countries draw borders in 
the Middle-East. Some places with less than 
30.000 inhabitants became independent 
states (such as Kuwait), but the Kurdish 
area was divided between the four states 
mentioned above. It is commonly thought 
that the reason for the unfounded divisions 
were economic and political interests of the 
Western countries, who wanted to be able 
to practice “divide and rule” politics in the 
Middle-East area.28 
Nowadays the Kurds are fighting for 
their rights in Turkey and Iran. In Iraq, 
they’ve obtained autonomy which has ex-
isted since 1991. Resulting from the civil 
war in Syria, at the moment the Kurds are 
governing their own territories and have a de 
facto autonomy.29  In other parts of the 
Kurdistan area, the situation has not 
evolved and the conditions are similar to 
those in the days following the First World 
War. The situation in Iran regarding the 
Kurdish minority is also very tense. 
 
Iranian Kurds 
 
There are about 10 million Kurds in Iran. 
They live mostly near the Iraqi and Turkish 
borders, in an area that is referred to by the 
Kurds as “Eastern Kurdistan”. The Iranian 
Kurds have actively tried to obtain equal 
civil rights compared to Persians during the 
last 100 years. Since they have not suc-
ceeded in obtaining civil rights in a peaceful 
manner, the Kurds have been engaging in 
an armed battle against the Iranian govern-
ment for over 50 years.  
 
                                                 
                                                
28 For more information see the following report: “ 
The treaty of peace between the Allied and 
Associated Powers and Turkey signed at SÈVRES 
10 August 1920, [http://www.fransamaltingvon-
geusau.com/documents/dl1/h1/1.1.18.pdf]. 
29 Burch Jonathon, ” Syrian Kurds take fragile steps 
towards autonomy”, Reuters 2 August 2013,  
[http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-
syria-crisis-kurds-idUSBRE9710B320130802]. 
Crisis of 1946, also Known as the Iran-
Azerbaijan Crisis 
 
During the World War II, in 1946, the So-
viet Union and Great-Britain had occupied 
Iran in order to guarantee the control and 
management of Iranian oil. With the help of 
the Soviet Union, the Kurds and Azeris of 
Iran were able to form the self-governed re-
gions of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in Iran. 
These regions existed for less than a year, 
until the Soviet Union made a deal on oil 
trade with the Iranian government. As a 
consequence, it stopped supporting the 
Kurds and Turks of Iran. After that, the 
Iranian army abolished the Kurdish and 
Turkish governments and executed their 
leaders, putting an end to the era of self-
govern.30  
Since then, Kurdish formed armed 
guerilla groups and started fighting against 
the central government, represented by the 
Shah at that time. Now, they mostly wish to 
establish a self-governed region of Kurdi-
stan, similar to that of modern Iraq. The 
Kurds are collaborating with other ethnic 
minorities who have the same wish.  
 
Kurds under the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 
In the early 1980’s, Kurdish representatives 
started negotiations with the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, in order to obtain basic civil 
rights. The negotiations did not last long, 
since the government flatly refused any 
form of self-government to be formed in 
the Kurdish region. Since then, a war has 
been going on between Kurdish guerilla 
fighters and the Islamic government, caus-
ing thousands of casualties in both parties.  
At the present moment, the base for 
the Kurdish guerilla fighters is located in the 
Kurdistan federation of Northern Iraq. Out 
of all the Kurdish political parties, PJAK 
 
30 McDowall David, “A modern history of the  
Kurds”, p. 231, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 2007 London. 
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(The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan) is the 
only one to have had armed confrontations 
with the Iranian government during the past 
couple of years.31  
 
3.1.4 Iranian Arabs 
 
Approximately 2% of the Iranian popula-
tion are Arabs, most of them Shiite Mus-
lims. Same as the other minorities, it is for-
bidden for the Arabs to be educated in their 
native tongue. However, since the Koran is 
written originally in Arab, the language is 
widely taught in all Iranian schools. 
Most Iranian Arabs live in the coastal 
regions of southern Iran by the Persian 
Gulf, which is rich in natural resources. 
This is one of the reasons why Iran is 
strictly trying to “Persianize” the Arab mi-
nority, in order to have secure access to the 
riches. The Arabs in Iran are fighting for 
their rights as the other minorities are, 
against the Iranian government. Parties such 
as al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic 
Front are striving to get the Arab region in-
dependent from the rest of the country.32  
 
3.1.5 Iranian Baloch  
 
The Baloch are a people whose territory is 
now divided between Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. They form about 2% of the 
Iranian population. In Iran, most of the Ba-
loch population lives in southern parts of 
the country, near the Pakistan border, in a 
region called Balochistan. 
The Baloch are mostly Sunni Muslims, 
which causes a lot of trouble for them in a 
country ruled by Shiites. For the Balochs, 
religion is reported to have more impor-
tance than their ethnicity.  Nonetheless, Ba-
                                                 
                                                
 
31 Ken Timmerman, “Iranian Troops Attack  
Kurdish Camps in Iraq”, 19 July 2011, [http:// 
www.newsmax.com/kentimmerman/nourial-maliki-
iran-iraq-kurds/2011/07/19/id/404082]. 
32 Ahwazi People's Democratic Front, 1 August  
2013, [http://www.adpf.org/AR/]. 
lochs remain one of the most discriminated 
minorities of Iran. Their region is said to be 
the poorest and underdeveloped of the 
whole country, with a higher infant mortal-
ity rate and lower life expectation than any-
where else in Iran.  
The Balochs are fighting for their 
rights against the Iranian government. Most 
of the death penalties attributed between 
2004 and 2009 have been to Balochs. Politi-
cal parties such as People’s Resistance 
Movement of Iran (PRMI) are fighting to 
establish a self-governed region to the Ba-
lochistan.33 There have been suicide bomb-
ings and violent confrontations between Ba-
lochs and Persians. 
Most of the Iranian minorities have 
similar hopes; they are against a strong, cen-
tral government, and demand power to be 
shared to include also real representation of 
ethnic minorities. Iran cannot become a 
democratic country as long as the minorities 
wishes are not taken into account. With the 
situation going on like this, Iran is con-
stantly on the verge of a civil war. The situa-
tion of religious minorities is far from being 
any better, as we shall see in the following. 
 
3.2 The Religious Minorities in Iran 
 
Contrary to what is commonly thought, Is-
lam is not the only tolerated religion in Iran, 
although Muslims do form 98% of the Ira-
nian population. Out of these, some 89% 
are Shiite, the rest being Sunni. Christian, 
Zoroastrian34, and Jewish communities con-
stitute 2% of the population.  
When studying these figures one must 
keep in mind that every Iranian must belong 
to one of the groups mentioned above ac-
cording to the Iranian law. It is impossible 
to declare to be atheist, Hindu or Buddhist, 
 
33  Zurutuza Karlos, “Inside Iran’s Most Secretive 
Region”, The Diplomat, 16 May 2011, [http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/05/16/insideiran%E2%80%9
9s-most-secretive-region/]. 
34 Yarsan, [http://www.ahle-haqq.com/intro.html]. 
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for instance. Thus, inside these religious 
groups are many non-believers, and the 
number of real believers would be much 
lower. Also members of some other reli-
gious minorities might be forced to declare 
themselves as something else, distorting the 
figures even more. For instance Baha’is, 
presented in the CIA’s table below, is now a 
forbidden religion and they do not have the 
right to declare to be practicing it. 
 
Table 2: Iranian religious groups according to 
              the CIA.35 
 
Iran is known for its strict attitude towards 
the practicing of religion. Especially the 
situation of those who do not belong to any 
of the officially accepted religious groups 
(Shiite, Sunni, Jewish, Christian and Zoroas-
trian) is one of concern.  
The International Human Rights Fed-
eration FIDH (la Fédération Internationale des 
Ligues des Droits de l’Homme) has expressed 
their concern over the poor situation of re-
ligious minorities in Iran in their report dat-
ing from 2003. Although ten years have 
passed since the publication of “Discrimina-
tion against religious minorities in Iran”, lit-
tle has changed since in the country in the 
field of religious freedom, with the constitu-
tion remaining unaltered during this decade. 
FIDH’s report states the situation of reli-
gious minorities in Iran to be “alarming”. 
According to the document, they “are vic-
tims of discrimination on a daily basis both 
in law and in practice”.36  
                                                 
                                                                           
35 Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook, 
18 July 2013, [https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html].  
36 Discrimination against religious minorities in 
IRAN, FIDH (la Fédération Internationale des 
The situation of those belonging to the 
religious minorities of the country is diffi-
cult. They face severe, direct discrimination. 
For instance, an Iranian being anything 
other than Shiite Muslim has no right to run 
for presidency, and their access to any other 
key-position is restricted. Only Shiite Mus-
lims have the right to propagate their reli-
gious ideology. It is forbidden to convert 
from Islam to other religions, but according 
to the law religious minorities are allowed to 
convert to Islam. If a Shiite Muslim would 
convert, he would be named a Mortad 
(Apostasy in Islam), would face execution 
and after that, his possessions would be di-
vided among the Islamic community.  
The legislation is different depending 
on whether a crime has been committed by 
a Muslim or a representative of another re-
ligion. They can also vary in accordance of 
the religion of the victim. Non-Muslims are 
treated as second-class citizens, and there 
are many laws proving this. For example, if 
a Muslim man commits adultery with a 
Muslim woman, he is punished by 100 
lashes. However, if the man is non-Muslim, 
he faces death penalty according to the Ar-
ticle 88 of the Civil Code. This clearly indi-
cates that the life of a Muslim is perceived 
more valuable than that of a non-Muslim. 
And there are plenty more examples. In 
cases of homicides, there is “blood money” 
that should be paid to the victim’s family. 
The sum is twice as high if the victim has 
been a Muslim man, compared to a member 
of the recognized religious minorities, or of 
a female victim. The Civil Code forbids the 
marriage between a Muslim woman and a 
non-Muslim man, but a Muslim man is al-
lowed to take a non-Muslim wife. 37 These 
 
Ligues des Droits de l’Homme), August 2003, 
[http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ir0108a.pdf]. 
37 Discrimination against religious minorities in 
IRAN, FIDH (la Fédération Internationale des 
Ligues des Droits de l’Homme), August 2003, 
[http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ir0108a.pdf]. 
Muslim (official) 98% 
(Shia 89%, Sunni 9%) 
Other (includes Zoro-
astrian, Jewish, Chris-
tian, Yarsan and Baha'i) 
2% 
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are just a couple of examples from a vast ar-
ray of discriminative laws.  
The Iranian government is controlling 
the media and Internet. Through them, it 
targets regularly the religious minorities with 
negative campaigning. The Iranian Ministry 
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) super-
vises closely the religious minority groups 
and their relations with foreign countries. 
They are especially interested in knowing if 
anyone is collaborating with Israel or the 
West. According to FIDH, the Iranian au-
thorities have closed down dozens of 
churches and other holy places of the reli-
gious minorities of the country. They also 
have imprisoned thousands of non-
Muslims. FIDH urges the international 
community to put pressure on the Iranian 
authorities in order to ameliorate the situa-
tion of the religious minorities and to free 
their imprisoned members.38 
The theocratic system in Iran leans on 
the rules of Islam, according to which 
members of other religious groups are infi-
dels and Islam is the only religion everyone 
should be following or convert into. As 
long as Iran is governed in a theocratic way, 
it is impossible to change the policy they are 
conducting against religious minorities. The 
rulers now are convinced that theocracy is 
better than democracy. They are justifying 
this by claiming that Islam guarantees a 
good life also after this one, if followed to 
the letter. For over 30 years now, different 
international organs have been questioning 
the policy led by Iran on ethnic and reli-
gious minorities.   
Doctor Ahmed Shaheed, the UN re-
porter specialized in human rights issues, 
revealed a document in February 2013 re-
porting the human rights violations that are 
taking place in Iran. The report states that 
situation regarding human rights is alarm-
                                                 
                                                
38 FIDH (International Federation for Human  
Rights)Resolution on human rights violations, 2 
August 2013, http://www.fidh.org/iran-resolutions 
-on-human-rights-violations-13754 
ingly poor, the civil rights of ethnic and reli-
gious minorities are continuously trampled 
on, and prisons are filled with political dis-
sidents. Doctor Shaheed calls for the inter-
national attention to be brought on these 
matters and a response towards these viola-
tions.39  
It is hard to believe that the situation 
of the minorities could ameliorate as long as 
the system is theocratic, because structural 
change remains impossible. All current rules 
draw from the Koran; and it is strictly for-
bidden to contest what is written in the holy 
book or “update” the content, even on an 
ideological level. The theocratic rulers are 
strictly against any discussion on democra-
tizing the country and any attempt to guar-
antee safe and peaceful existence for the 
minority groups. Calls for democracy simply 
cannot be met in a theocracy.  
 
4 Women in Iran 
 
94 percent of Iranian women attend school, 
and women comprise over 60% of all uni-
versity graduates.  Yet, the women of the 
country are systematically discriminated 
against, and are unequal to men in regards 
of the legislation. In the Article 21 of the 
Iranian Constitution, it is stated that "the 
government must ensure the rights of 
women in all respects, in conformity with 
Islamic criteria”.40 It is that Islamic criteria, 
however, that allows to discriminate against 
women. 
First of all, the Constitution of the Is-
lamic Republic does not treat women as in-
 
39 “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situati-
on of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, 
28 February 2013, [http://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Sess
ion22/A-HRC-22-56_en.pdf]. 
40 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
8 July 2013, [http://www.imj.ir/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=583:1388-11-17-
15-39-46&catid=84:1388-11-03-08-40-10&Itemid 
=222] & [http://www.alaviandassociates.com/do- 
cuments/constitution.pdf]. 
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dependent human beings, but as dependent 
of their husbands. The man is the leader 
and can make decisions about the woman’s 
life. When an Iranian woman is born, her 
faith has already been decided since accord-
ing to the Koran and thus the Islamic Re-
publics laws, she is inferior to the man.  
According to Islam, the primary role of 
the woman is to take care of the household 
and children and serve her husband. Chil-
dren should be brought up according to the 
Koran’s principles. Koran is an advocate for 
the men, since it is written that women 
should be proper wives and mothers and 
submit themselves to their husband’s will. It 
is also written that if the women is unable 
to fulfill her husband’s needs and desires, 
the husband is allowed to take a new wife, 
and can be married to up to four women at 
the time. Women are of course allowed only 
one husband, no matter the circumstances. 
To divorce is a decision the man can take 
alone, regardless of the woman’s opinion. It 
is also possible for the woman to file for di-
vorce, but the process is much more com-
plex and they are more unlikely to be 
granted it. Regarding inheritance, women in 
Iran are entitled to half of what the men will 
get.  
There are many more gender-
discriminating restrictions in Iran. Most of 
the restrictions draw from the Koran, and 
the ideology according to which man is su-
perior, listed as follows41:  
 
- Married women require their husband's 
permission to apply for a passport. An 
unmarried woman below 40 years old 
can only have a passport with the writ-
ten consent of her parents.  
                                                 
                                                
41 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the Islamic  Republic of Iran”, 28 February 
2013, [http://www.iranrights.org/english/ 
attachments/doc_4249.pdf]. 
- Women must wear the Islamic Hejab42 
when outside, otherwise she will be 
strictly punished. 
- Women cannot run for presidency nor 
act as priests. 
- Women cannot be the head of the jus-
tice department. Their access to most of 
the key-positions in the country is re-
stricted. 
- The age of criminal responsibility for 
women is 9 years, compared to 15 for 
men. 
- The husband is allowed to ban his wife 
from working in any technical profes-
sion if he is able to prove that his wife’s 
job affects their family life or his wife’s 
character.  
- In 2013, a new regulation was passed, 
banning women the possibility to study 
certain subjects. The justification was 
that these subjects “are not compatible 
with the general character of women”. 
These banned subjects include courses 
on petroleum engineering, data man-
agement, communications, emergency 
medical technology, mechanical engi-
neering, law, political sciences, policing, 
social sciences, and religious studies. 
- Women cannot transfer nationality and 
citizenship to their husbands or chil-
dren, which has rendered stateless thou-
sands of children of Iranian women who 
have married Afghan or Iraqi refugees, 
as well as expatriate Iranian women 
married to non-Iranians.  
 
Besides these legislative restrictions, women 
are discriminated in softer ways in the em-
ployment market. For instance, women are 
overrepresented in lower skilled jobs and 
vastly underrepresented in higher skilled 
jobs. Besides, women cannot hold public 
office above the municipal level and tradi-
 
42 BBC News, “Hijab”, 3 September.2009, [http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/ 
hijab_1.shtml]. 
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tionally earn less than their male counter-
parts in similar jobs.  In fact, it has been re-
ported that only 32% of Iranian women are 
actively engaged in the labor market, com-
pared to 73% of men.43  
Until recently, Iranian universities have 
been a place where women and men have 
been studying together, after having fol-
lowed schooling in segregated groups. 
However, in 2013, the decision was made to 
segregate women from men also in the uni-
versities.44 
The status of women in Islamic coun-
tries, especially Iran, cannot be changed 
unless the Islamic laws are abolished. Most 
of the Iranian women are extremely un-
happy with the current situation and are 
demanding their rights at all possible 
turns.45 Many liberal people are condemned 
in Iran, and prisons are full of both men 
and women who have been trying to change 
the women’s status.46  
 
5 Iran’s Nuclear Power 
 
Iran’s nuclear power program begun under 
the Shah Reza Pahlavi’s regime in the 
1960’s, and rapidly developed during the 
following decade. Since the Shah was an ally 
of the West, the nuclear program did not 
                                                 
                                                
43 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”,  28 February 
2013, [http://www.iranrights.org/english/ 
attachments/doc_4249.pdf]. 
44 FIDH (International Federation for Human 
Rights) Resolution on human rights violations, 2 
August 2013, [http://www.fidh.org/iran-resolutions 
-on-human-rights-violations-13754]. 
45 The Voice of America, “Iranian Women Wait for 
Freedom, 30 Years After Islamic Revolution”, VOA 
2 November 2009, [http://www.voanews.com/  
conent/a-13-2009-01-29-voa52-68711712/409584. 
html]. 
46 Esfandiari Golnaz, “Women's Rights Activists 
Tell Rohani What They Want”, Radio Free Europe 
14 September 2013, [http://www.rferl.org/con- 
tent/iran-rohani-women-demands/25045159.html]. 
cause international disapproval or indigna-
tion back then.47   
Things changed when the anti-West Is-
lamic government took over. For decades 
now, the enriching of uranium in Iran has 
been drawing the attention and concern of 
the international community.48 Since 2003, 
the enriching has driven Iran into an ongo-
ing conflict with the international commu-
nity, because there are severe suspicions 
that Iran is enriching uranium for the pur-
pose of building a nuclear weapon. What is 
causing these suspicions is the fact that Iran 
wants to enrich uranium itself, even though 
enriched uranium can be purchased abroad 
for a low price. Iran is claiming that it is 
producing only uranium that is enriched to 
a low-level, suitable for reactors and medical 
research. However, the exact same tech-
niques can be used to enrich uranium to a 
high-level, needed in the manufacturing of 
atomic weapons.  
 
5.1 The Cat-and-Mouse Game Against  
      International Authorities 
 
The Iranian authorities claim that enriching 
uranium up to 20% is an international 
right.49  They state that they have no inten-
tion of breaking international laws by en-
riching uranium for the procurement of nu-
clear weapons.50   
However, according to the Institute for 
Science and International Security, Iran is 
 
47 The nuclear program of Iran, June 2013, [http://  
www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/ nuclear/]. 
48 Iran watch, “A History of Iran's Nuclear 
Program”, 1 March.2012, [http://www.iranwatch. 
org/our-publications/weapon-program-background 
-report/history-irans-nuclear-program]. 
49 George Marcus and Hosseinian Zahra, “Iran will 
destroy Israeli cities if attacked: Khamenei”, Reuters 
21 March 2013, [http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/03/21/us-iran-khameneiidUSBRE92K0LA 
201303 21]. 
50 Presses-TV, “Ahmadinejad: 20% enrichment, 
Iran’s right under intl. law”, [http://www.presstv. 
ir/detail/2012/05/30/243877/iran-20-enrichment-
legal-right/]. 
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expected to achieve a “critical capability” to 
produce sufficient weapon-grade uranium 
by mid-2014, without being detected. Iran 
has firm plans to install thousands of new 
centrifuges in its centrifuge sites, which is 
thought to be because it needs more en-
riched uranium for building a nuclear 
weapon. The same report also urges for 
more sanctions, negotiations and “increased 
frequency of international inspections”, in 
order to stop Iran from building nuclear 
weapon.51 
The P5+1 group (USA, France, UK, 
Russia, China and Germany) have gathered 
many times in order to find a suitable solu-
tion to the Iranian nuclear problem. In Sep-
tember 2013, the negotiations have not led 
to any results. Most of the Western negotia-
tors and experts on nuclear programs have 
stopped believing that the issue could be 
solved through negotiations. Iran is playing 
a cat-and-mouse game with the P5+1 coun-
tries and the monitors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran allows 
for the monitors to visit some of its nuclear 
power plants, but denies access to some 
others. In addition, Iran is believed to have 
dozens of secret nuclear power plants, 
which are under the direct control of Iran’s 
Supreme Leader.  
 
5.2 Is Iran Really Building Nuclear  
      Weapons?  
 
Iran is in fact pursuing its capability to 
manufacture nuclear weapons, because the 
local authorities feel it is their “religious 
duty”. They also see it as a way to have for-
ever control over Iran and become an un-
contested Great Power in the Middle East. 
                                                 
                                                
51 Albright David & Walrond Christina, “Priority is 
limiting the number and type of centrifuges at 
Natanz, Fordow, and any other centrifuge site Iran 
may now be constructing”, Institute for Science and 
International Security 30 May 2013, [http://isis-
online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/critical 
_capability_op-ed_30July2013.pdf]. 
In the following, these ideas are further de-
veloped.52  
In its pursuit for a nuclear weapon, 
Iran is leaning to the Koran’s verses, which 
urge to prepare oneself against enemies, and 
to better equip oneself compared to them. 
Iran is interpreting this as a request to ob-
tain a nuclear weapon, since its enemies the 
U.S. and Israel also have one. Iran’s Su-
preme Leader repeats often the following 
verse of the Koran, especially when he tries 
to speed up the process of building the 
weapon53:  
 
Against them, make ready your strength to 
the utmost of your power, including steeds of 
war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the 
enemies, of Allah and your enemies.  
 
Thus, according to Khamenei, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran needs to acquire the new-
est weapons, in order to be able to defend 
itself. Khamenei claims that even the late 
founder of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini, 
had decided to reactivate the nuclear pro-
gram.54 
Israel, India and Pakistan are all close 
to Iran and have nuclear weapons. Khame-
nei does not see why Iran shouldn’t have 
one as well. The idea is that if Iran has its 
own nuclear weapons, no one would be 
able to attack the country. Of course all 
other Middle-Eastern states are against the 
idea of Iran having its own nuclear weap-
ons.  
 
 
 
52 W. Sherrill Clifton, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, March 2012, [http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs 
/npr_19-1_ sherrill_iran_bomb.pdf]. 
53 Quran, chapter: al-Anfal, evidence:60, [http:// 
library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?
flag=1&bk_no=132&ID=2700]. 
54 International for Science and International 
Security, 20 April 2012, [http://isis-online.org/up- 
loads/isis-reports/documents/Khamenei_1984 
_statement_20April2012.pdf]. 
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Israel is especially against Iran having a 
nuclear weapon.55 Since Iran does not ap-
prove of the existence of Israel, the nuclear 
weapons might pose a real threat to Israel. 
In 1981, Israel attacked Iraq and destroyed 
their nuclear facilities. Experts believe that 
if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Israel 
would repeat the scenario of 1981 and 
would attack to destroy the nuclear equip-
ment. 56  Iran is not deaf for these threats; it 
has stated that if Israel attacks its nuclear 
facilities, it is going to attack back until Is-
rael is completely destroyed. 57 
The general opinion is that Iran is not 
going to stop enriching uranium, and wants 
to build nuclear weapons no matter the 
cost. The opposing side formed by the in-
ternational community, especially the U.S., 
U.K., France, Israel and Arab states and all 
their allies, are strongly against Iran’s ambi-
tions. If Iran was to build an atomic bomb, 
it could jeopardize the whole world, and es-
pecially the Middle East. Dealing with a 
theocratic state with nuclear weapons is not 
something the international community 
wants.  
There are two ways to solve the prob-
lem caused by Iran’s nuclear program: A) 
The rest of the world must accept Iran as a 
nuclear power, B) The international com-
munity puts an end to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram with political and ultimately military 
means. All the signs are pointing towards 
the fact that scenario A just is not an op-
                                                 
55 Shmulovich Michal, “Most Mideast countries do  
not want a nuclear Iran, poll finds”, Times of Israel, 6 
March.2013, [http://www.timesofisrael.com/  
most-mideast-countries-dont-want-a-nuclear-iran/]. 
56 H. Kahl Colin, “Before attacking Iran, Israel  
should learn from its 1981 strike on Iraq”, 
Washington Post 2 March 2012, [http://articles. was-
hingtonpost.com/2012-03-02/opinions/354 
50430_1_nuclear-weapons-israeli-strike-tuwaitha]. 
57 Press-TV, “Iran will raze Tel Aviv to ground if 
Israel attacks: Ayatollah Khamenei”, 21 March 
2013, [http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/03/21 
/294655/iran-will-raze-israel-to-ground-in-war/]. 
tion. In this case, it is likely that scenario B 
shall come true.  
 
5.3 Sanctions against Iran 
 
After the negotiations with Iran on their 
nuclear program failed to bring results, the 
West has imposed massive sanctions upon 
Iran. These sanctions affect all areas of life, 
regarding the normal people as well as the 
state. The purpose of the sanctions is to 
pressurize Iran to give up enriching ura-
nium and to stop the country from develop-
ing nuclear weapons. The sanctions target 
especially the import and export of oil and 
gas, which are areas that the economy of 
Iran relies heavily on. 
Since Iran’s biggest income comes 
from selling oil and gas, the sanctions have 
a huge impact on the state economy. As a 
result, Iran’s economy is facing its biggest 
crisis in a long time. The Iranians have to 
deal with an extraordinary high percentage 
of unemployment, while the prices of eve-
ryday goods are rocketing.  
The U.S. authorities claim that the 
sanctions are not targeted towards the peo-
ple, only towards the rulers. The economy 
of Iran is completely in the hands of the po-
litical elite and their close inner circle. While 
the sanctions are aimed at them, they also 
have a major impact on the everyday life of 
the local people.  
One of the reasons President Rouhani 
was elected, was that he should find 
through negotiations a common path with 
the West and thus the international com-
munity would lighten or cease the sanctions. 
However, a common path is likely to be 
found only when Iran stops enriching ura-
nium. Iran is not likely to do that. It re-
mains to be seen whether Rouhani, an ex-
perienced diplomat and negotiator, is able 
to persuade the West to abolish the sanc-
tions. That is likely to be the only way to 
save Iran’s economy. In addition, Israel has 
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vowed to attack Iran if the country does not 
put an end to its nuclear program. 
 
6 Iran and Terrorism  
 
The U.S. and many other countries accuse 
Iran of supporting terrorists and fundamen-
tal Islamic groups. Iran is also accused of 
killing members of its own opposition. For 
instance, Condoleezza Rice stated in March 
2006 that Iran has been actively supporting 
terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
For this reason, in October 2007, the U.S. 
added Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) to its list of foreign terrorist organi-
zations and has kept on demanding for the 
international sanctions to be respected and 
tightened.  
According to the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the link between Iran and terror-
ism dates back to 1984.  Among Iran's al-
leged terrorist activities have been the fol-
lowing58:  
 
- Observers say Iran had prior knowledge 
of Hezbollah attacks, such as the 1988 
kidnapping and murder of Colonel Wil-
liam Higgins, a U.S. Marine involved in 
a UN observer mission in Lebanon, and 
the 1992 and 1994 bombings of Jewish 
cultural institutions in Argentina. 
- Iran still has a price on the head of the 
Indian-born British novelist Salman 
Rushdie for what Iranian leaders call 
blasphemous writings about Islam in his 
1989 novel The Satanic Verses. 
- U.S. officials say Iran supported the 
group behind the 1996 truck bombing 
of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military resi-
dence in Saudi Arabia, which killed nine-
teen U.S. servicemen. 
- Military officials say numerous attacks 
since 2001 on U.S. and NATO troops in 
Afghanistan, and coalition forces in 
                                                 
58 Bruno Greg, “State Sponsors: Iran”, Council on 
Foreign Relations 13 October 2011, [http://www. 
cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362#p2].  
Iraq, have been attributed to Iranian-
made weapons. 
- A set of classified documents leaked by 
the website WikiLeaks.org in July 2010 
reports extensive collaboration between 
Iran and the Taliban, Afghan warlords, 
and al-Qaeda, but all the claims have not 
been corroborated (Guardian). 
- Iran has also been blamed for attacks in 
Balochistan in Pakistan. 
- In April 2011, the United States and the 
European Union accused the Quds 
Force of providing equipment and sup-
port to help the Syrian regime suppress 
revolts in Syria. 
- In October 2011, Washington accused 
the Quds Force of plotting to assassi-
nate the Saudi ambassador (NYT) to the 
United States, and plotting to bomb the 
Israeli Embassy in Washington and the 
Saudi and Israeli Embassies in Argen-
tina. 
 
Iran denies strictly all of these accusations. 
It claims to be itself a victim of international 
terrorism, and to be an actor in the war 
against terrorism.  
In November 2011, two Iranian men 
were caught in the United-States for their 
intent to murder the Ambassador to Saudi-
Arabia, causing a stir in the press. This 
event led to the US wanting tighter sanc-
tions against Iran, asking all of their allies to 
join them in their request. Two days after 
the men were caught, Ahmadinejad, who 
was president of Iran at that time, denied in 
a TV show that the men had any intentions 
of killing the ambassador, claiming that only 
uncivilized nations practice acts of terror-
ism, claiming that Iran has never committed 
any terrorist acts. According to President 
Ahmadinejad, the U.S. only tries to frighten 
Iran and prepare for war. He also stated 
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that Iran is strong and will ”cut the arms” 
of those who try to attack the country.59  
According to the TV show in question, 
it seems that the president Ahmadinejad has 
conveniently “forgotten” that Iran has sup-
ported terrorism many times in the past. 
The best-known example of this took place 
in Europe. It was the murdering of an Ira-
nian Kurdish party leader in Berlin in 1992. 
The European authorities revealed that Ira-
nian diplomats were behind the murder, 
which led to the EU cutting all diplomatic 
ties with Iran. Another act of terrorism 
committed by Iran happened in August 
1981, when Iranian agents murdered a for-
mer Iranian prime minister, Shapour Bak-
htiar, in his own heavily guarded house out-
side of Paris.60 This led to the worsening of 
the Iran-France relations. One must bear in 
mind that for many solved cases that prove 
the link between an act of terrorism and 
Iranian authorities, there are many cases 
that remain unclear or unsolved that are 
likely to have been executed by Iran. 
 
7 Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
When the Islamic Revolution took place in 
1979, the spirit of the Cold War was still 
strongly present in the area.  Most of the 
countries belonged either to the East’s or 
the West’s ideological camps. In 1979, the 
Iranian rulers were led by Khomeini’s Is-
lamic principles, and tried to create a for-
eign policy for Iran that was ”Neither East 
nor West; [but] Islamic Republic”. This 
never materialized, because Iran has good 
                                                 
                                                
59 “The Iranian president talks to Al Jazeera's Tony 
Harris about the latest diplomatic spat with the US 
and Saudi Arabia, the Arab spring, and Iranian 
politics.” Al-Jazeera 6 June 2012, [http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=gQoLJR6Sbj8]. 
60 Dickey Christopher, “Analysis: Iran's spies are 
losing the shadow war with US and Israel”, The 
Telegraph 7 August 2012, [http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/journalists/the-dailybeast/9460370/Analysis-
Irans-spies-are-losing-the-shadow-war-with-US-
and-Israel.html]. 
relations with the East camp, especially 
Russia (or U.S.S.R. at the time of the revo-
lution) and China. These two countries re-
main the major allies of Iran to this day, 
even if the country has also a political 
agenda of its own.  
It is been reported that Khamenei’s 
viewpoints on the Iranian foreign policy in-
clude61:  
 
- Principle of exporting the revolution  
- Principle of “no domination”  
- Defending the integrity of Islam and 
Muslims  
- Principle of mutual respect and non-
interference in other countries’ affairs  
- Principle of negating oppression and 
supporting the oppressed  
- No East, No West principle  
- Helping liberation movements  
- Unity of the Islamic ummah   
- Relations based on Islamic and human 
principles 
 
In reality, many of these viewpoints have 
not been pursued at all and have been 
claimed by Khomeini for cosmetic pur-
poses. Out of these viewpoints, the Islamic 
Republic has been focusing on spreading its 
own ideology and suppressing dissidents, 
i.a. by focusing on the following acts: 
 
- Supporting Islamist groups62, especially 
Shiites, in their efforts to spread the Is-
lamic revolution and implementation of 
the Sharia law around the world.63 
 
61 Mir-Khalili Seyed Javad, “Imam Khomeini’s 
Viewpoints on Iranian Foreign Policy”, Iranreview 28 
May 2008, [http://www.iranreview.org/content/ 
Documents/Imam_Khomeini%E2%80%99s_View
points_on_Iranian_Foreign_Policy.htm]. 
62 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
article 152–155, [http://www.alaviandassociates. 
com/documents/constitution.pdf]. 
63 Islamic Revolution in Leader's message to Bashar 
al-Asad,  Shafaf March 2013, [http://shafaf.ir/fa/ 
news/184361/%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9
%85-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9-
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- Gaining more influence and power in 
the Islamic world by spreading anti-
Israel ideology.64 
- Stopping the principles of democracy 
from spreading in the Middle-East and 
North-Africa by spreading negative 
propaganda65 on the Western princi-
ples.66 
- Being a partner of Russia and China:  
Even though Iran officially is a member-
state of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM)67, in practice Iran is a partner of 
China and Russia.68 Iran’s interest in this 
alliance is to block or diminish the 
flooding of Western influences in the 
Middle East and North Africa region, 
and to carry on with its nuclear pro-
                                                                            
                                                
%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7
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%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF]. 
64 Erdbrink Thomas, “Khamenei: Iran will back ‘any 
nations, any groups’ fighting Israel”, Washington Post 
3 February 2012, [http://articles.washingtonpost. 
com/2012-02-03/world/35445760_1_supreme-lea-
der-resumption-of-nuclear-talks-nuclear-facilities]. 
65 Khabar Online, “Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Khameneis speech about the democracy”, June 
2012, [http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/  
173749/]. 
66 Rasa News Agency “Ayatollah Khamenei led the 
Liberal Democracy bases into passivity”, 10 June 
2013, [http://www.rasanews.ir/En/NSite  
/FullStory/News/?Id=292]. 
67 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): [http://  
www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm]. 
68 Nazemroaya Mahdi Darius, Confrontation 
between military blocs: The Eurasian “Triple 
Alliance.” The Strategic Importance of Iran for 
Russia and China”, Globalresearch 23 January 2012, 
[http://www.globalresearch.ca/confrontation-bet-
ween-military-blocs-the-eurasian-triple-alliance-the-
strategic-importance-of-iran-for-russia-and-china/ 
28790]. 
Leverett Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, “Towards 
a Russia -China -Iran Military Alliance?”, Globalre-
search 5 February 2010, [http://www.Globalre-
search. ca/towards-a-russia-china-iran-military-alli- 
ance/17471]. 
gram. China and Russia on the other 
hand have economic interests in keeping 
Iran as their partner.   
- Bringing chaos to neighboring countries: 
Iran tries to bring chaos in its surround-
ing countries in order to fool the inter-
national community. If there are many 
crises, focus will not be placed on the 
discontentment of the Iranians towards 
their rulers.69  
- Wanting to become a nuclear power by 
developing its own nuclear program – 
Iran sees this as a means to become an 
invincible Great Power.70 
- Scaring and silencing dissidents and 
enemies in all corners of the world 
through acts of terrorism.71 
- Practicing double standards in regards 
of its nuclear program.72 
 
During the almost 40 years of the Islamic 
republic, Iran has strived to gain influence 
and stuck with its principle not to collabo-
rate with the West. In the following, the 
policy Iran adopts towards some key coun-
tries is briefly presented.  
 
7.1 Iran and Israel 
 
Iran argues that Israel is behind all the 
problems in the Middle East, and would73 
happily see the country being erased off the 
world’s map.74 The feeling of hate is mu-
 
69 For more information, see chapter 7.1. of this 
document 
70 W. Sherrill Clifton, [http://cns.miis.edu/npr/  
pdfs/npr_19-1_sherrill_iran_bomb.pdf], Nonproli- 
feration Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2012, 
[http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_19-1_sherrill_ 
iran_bomb.pdf]. 
71 For more information, see chapter 6 of this 
document. 
72 For more information, see chapter 5 of this 
document. 
73 Ynet-News, “Khamenei: 'Tumor' of Israel is 
world's biggest problem”, 19 August 2012, [http:// 
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4270418,00. 
html]. 
74 Keinon Herb, Paraszczuk Joanna, ”Khamenei:  
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tual, as Israel sees Iran as the mother of ter-
rorist groups and a country that keeps on 
adding to the political conflicts of the Mid-
dle East. The roots of the Israeli-Iranian 
conflict are religious and historical, but it is 
also a conflict on who can be the “supreme 
leader” of the region and who has the most 
powerful friends. In the following, these 
reasons are explained a little further.  
                                                                           
 
Religious reasons 
 
Ever since Islam was born, there have been 
problems between Muslims and Jews. In 
many different parts of the Koran, it is writ-
ten that Jews have betrayed God, and that 
they are enemies of Islam, Allah and 
Prophet Mohammed. According to Mus-
lims, Koran has been directly sent from Al-
lah to all humans. Those who follow the 
Koran to the letter believe that everyone 
should follow Islam, Koran, and the rules 
of the religion. Thus some Islamic groups, 
rulers and fervent believers have a difficult 
time accepting Jews, who they consider as 
their enemy by default.75  
The foreign policy of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran is in accordance to Prophet 
Mohammed’s words in the Koran. This for-
eign policy does not accept Jewish people. 
This is one of the reasons why Iran does 
not approve the existence of Israel and 
wishes to see it destroyed.  
 
 
Zionist regime will disappear from map”, Jerusalem 
Post 15 August 2012, [http://www.jpost.com/ 
Iranian-Threat/News/Khamenei-Zionist-regime-
will-disap-pear-from-map]. See also, Ayatollah 
Seyyed Ahmad Alam a-Hoda, member of the 
Assembly of Experts of the Supreme Leader: Our 
goal is to erase Israel from the world map, Raja-
News 30 September.2013, [http://www.rajanews. 
com/ detail.asp?id=156163]. 
75 Quran, [http://www.barkati.net/quran  
/Translation/holyquran017.htm]. 
Historic reasons 
 
Before the Islamic revolution of 1979, the 
ruler of Iran Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
maintained good relations with Israel. They 
formed together a coalition that was the 
counterforce to the Pan-Arabic Nationalist 
movement that raised its head in that times, 
and collaborated peacefully on various top-
ics. Shah was the enemy of Khomeini, so 
when he took power all the allies under 
Shah’s regime were considered as enemies.  
Before the revolution, Iran used to be 
an ally with Israel, the U.S.A. and the West. 
Shah’s government worked in collaboration 
with its allies to help combat Islamist 
groups. So when Khomeini took power, he 
was especially resentful of this fact and saw 
this as one more reason to hate Israel and 
Iran’s past Western allies. Khomeini 
claimed that Israel ran under the Shah’s ap-
proval an Intelligence Service organ called 
SAVAK that he stated to have committed 
all kinds of criminal acts on Iranians, espe-
cially liberals that were opposed to the 
Shah. According to present Iranian rulers, 
before the revolution of 1979, Israel and the 
U.S. gave their support to the Shah’s sup-
porters, who were against the forming of 
the Islamic Republic. Present rulers of Iran 
blame the U.S. and Israel on having stolen 
Iranian natural resources such as gas and oil 
when they were collaborating with the 
Shah’s regime.  
After the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
founded, Israel immediately lost its ally and 
saw it turn into an extremist Islamic state 
that wishes to see Israel destroyed.  
 
The relations between Israel and Iran after 1979 
 
After 1979, the good relations between the 
countries stopped to a halt. With its oil 
money, Iran revived all Shiite extremist 
groups and started to pose a real threat to 
the existence of Israel. The Islamic Republic 
of Iran is the ally of al-Assad’s Syria, and 
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together they support anti-Israel groups 
such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel is es-
pecially concerned about the nuclear weap-
ons Iran might have in the future.  
Iran also blames Israel of supporting 
several antirevolutionary groups, including 
Mujahed’s Khalq Organizaition (MKO), the 
Kurdish Free Life Party of Kurdistan 
(PJAK) and the Baluchi group Jundullah, 
which are fighting against the Iranian gov-
ernment. Israel denies these accusations.76  
Iran feels that Israel together with U.S. 
and their allies want to overthrow the Is-
lamic government. The cold war has been 
going on for 34 years between Iran and Is-
rael.  Until now (2013) it has not turned into 
proper military action yet, but has been 
fought through Hezbollah and Hamas.  
Israel has good relations with the 
neighboring countries of Iran. Although it is 
not a NATO member state, it has has good 
relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, the Gulf 
countries and the Kurdish Federation in 
North-Iraq because it is a strong ally of the 
United States. Saudi-Arabia, which is the 
number 1 enemy of Iran among Arab coun-
tries, is ready to support Israel by all means 
if Iran would attack it.77  
Now the priority for Israel is to stop 
Iran from building an atomic weapon. The 
Israeli authorities have firmly stated many 
times that if it looks like Iran is about to get 
a nuclear weapon, the Israeli forces would 
be forced to act.78 The Iranian authorities 
on the other hand have threatened to wipe 
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Israel off the map if it ever tried to attack 
Iran.79  
 
What are the options for Iran and Israel?  
 
There are two likely scenarios between Iran 
and Israel: a peaceful one, or a one that in-
volves military action. The current situation 
reminds that of India and Pakistan some 
years ago, when they almost ran into war 
because of their disagreement over who 
should own nuclear weapons. A power bal-
ance was finally established between both 
nuclear countries and their relations were 
stabilized. This can also happen between Is-
rael and Iran, if Israel approves of Iran’s 
nuclear program, and Iran would accept the 
existence of Israel and stop supporting 
Hezbollah and Hamas. If this happens, the 
two countries would contribute to a more 
peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East and 
they could have normal relations with each 
other. However, this scenario is extremely 
unlikely. 
There are several reasons why the cold 
war between Israel and Iran could turn into 
a military war: 
 
- A peaceful problem solving is not in ac-
cordance with the foreign policy princi-
ples of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as 
Iran can’t accept the existence of a Jew-
ish state. 
- Iran does not have the intention of giv-
ing up its nuclear program, and Israel on 
the other hand does not want Iran to 
have a nuclear weapon. 
- Israel does not want to see Iran to be-
come a Great Power in the region of the 
Middle-East. 
- Iran is not likely to stop supporting Is-
lamic groups. 
 
79 Ahren Raphael, “Iran would barely retaliate if its 
nuclear program were attacked”, Times of Israel 21 
August 2013, [http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran- 
would-barely-retaliate-if-its-nuclear-program-were-
attacked/]. 
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- The allies of Iran are getting weaker, 
while Israel’s allies are becoming 
stronger.  
 
For these reasons, it is possible for the two 
countries to get caught in an armed conflict 
at some point. Compromises between Iran 
and Israel in this context look extremely 
unlikely. 
 
7.2 Iran and Syria 
 
As the leader of the international Shiite 
community, Iran never fails to support the 
Shiite Muslims in Middle-Eastern conflicts, 
regardless of whether they are part of the 
government or the opposition. The country 
supports Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi-
Arabia, Sudan and Syria, and is opposed to 
Sunni Muslims’ uprisings in Iran, Iraq and 
Syria. A good example of this is the coun-
try’s different positioning towards uprisings 
in Bahrain and in Syria. In Bahrain, Iran 
supports the Shiites who are against the 
Monarch, who himself is a Sunni. In Syria 
on the other hand, Iran supports the cur-
rent ruler, the Alawite Bashar al-Assad 
against the opposition, because the opposi-
tion mainly consists of Sunnis. This is a 
clear indication that Iran shows its support 
only to Shiite Muslims.  
Ever since the uprising started in Syria, 
Iran has been the strongest supporter of 
Bashar al-Assad, claiming that in reality, the 
majority of Syrians support al-Assad’s re-
gime. The commander of the Army of the 
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution 
Mohammad Ali Jafari has announced that 
Iran supports al-Assad financially, politically 
and diplomatically.80 Jafari also stated that 
Iran’s special Quds army has long been pre-
sent in Syria because of the conflict. He 
                                                 
                                                
80 Black Ian, “Iran confirms it has forces in Syria 
and will take military action if pushed”, The 
Guardian, 16 September 2012, [http://www.theguar-
dian.com/world/2012/sep/16/iran-middleeast].  
claims however that the army’s role is solely 
consultative and non-military. 
If the international community decides 
to attack Syria, Iran has proclaimed to in-
terpret the attack as one against itself. This 
has been clearly stated i.a. by Ali Akbar Ve-
layati, the highest counselor regarding Iran’s 
foreign affairs,81 and Saqfi Amiri82, a re-
searcher at Iran’s strategy department. As 
for the commander of the Army of the 
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution 
Mohammad Ali Jafari, he declared that if 
such an attack should occur, Iran will de-
fend Syria with all its might.83  
For a long time now, Syria has been a 
strategic ally to Iran. The countries’ ties be-
gan to tighten already in 1979, after the Ira-
nian revolution. In the Iran-Iraq war, Syria 
was the only Arab country to support Iran. 
In the recent times, the economical bond 
has also tightened between the two coun-
tries. As is well known, numerous interna-
tional sanctions fall upon Iran. As a result, 
Iran is trying to figure out new ways to pur-
sue international trade despite the sanctions. 
Now, Iran is using Syria as a channel to en-
ter the international markets. In February 
2013, Iran, Iraq and Syria signed a contract 
according to which a gas pipe would be 
ready in 2015, through which the natural 
gas of Iran can be transported through Iraq 
until Syria, where it then can be sold to 
European markets.84  
 
81 Press TV, ”Attack on Syria, strike against Iran, 
allies: Velayati”, 07 August 2013, [http://www. 
presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/26/285606/attacking-
syria-is-attacking-iran-velayati/]. 
82 Saqfi Ameri Naser, ”Iran and Syrian relations,” 
Center for Strategic Center, 13 February 2013,  
[http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=fa&abtid
=07&&depid=44&semid=2462]. 
83 Fars News Agency, ”IRGC Blasts Fabrication of 
Commander's Remarks on Syria,” 19 September 
2012, [http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?  
nn=9106241164]. 
84 The Free Syrian Army, which belongs to the  
Opposition, kidnapped 48 Iranian citizens in August 
2012. The chairman of the opposition claimed that 
amongst the hostages, there were soldiers of the 
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On the other hand, Iran’s relations 
with the Syrian opposition are reciprocally 
tense. According to the Syrian opposition, 
Iran is involved in training the Syrian army 
of al-Assad, and providing them with weap-
ons.85  
Iran sees Syria as its strategic extension. 
That is one of the reasons why the country 
is so interested in the current events of Syria 
and the outcome of the uprising. Since Iran, 
Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Ji-
had are allies, the leaders of Iran feel that 
the strategic borders of Iran reach up until 
the Mediterranean coast. Even Barack 
Obama’s security adviser Thomas Donilon 
has stated that Syria is a strategic bridge for 
Iran. If Iran loses Syria, the influence and 
authority the country has in the region will 
crumble. Donilon added that if the current 
regime in Syria is overthrown, Iran will no 
longer be able to threaten Israel, its archen-
emy.86  
All in all Iran has a major role in the 
Syrian conflict. Without Iran’s support, al-
Assad couldn’t have had enough power to 
continue his battle against the opposition, 
and the conflict would most likely already 
have ended to the victory of the opposition. 
To truly solve the problems Syria, it is nec-
essary to first solve the problems in Iran, 
otherwise Iran will keep on fuelling the con-
flict.  
                                                                            
Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, 
supporting al-Assad against the people. Iran assured 
that the persons were just normal pilgrims. In the 
end, the Iranian hostages were released as part of an 
exchange of prisoners, during which the Syrian 
government released 2.130 prisoners in total. Al 
Arabia News, “Iraq green lights gas pipeline deal 
with Iran, Syria”, 20 February 2013, [http://www. 
alara-biya.net/articles/2013/02/20/267257.html]. 
85 CBCNEWS,” Syrian opposition forces free 48 
Iranians in prisoner swap,” 9 January 2013, [http:// 
www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/01/09/syria-
iran-prisoner-swap.html]. 
86 Saqfi Ameri Naser, ”Iran and Syrian relations,” 
Center for Strategic Center, 13 February 2013,  
[http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=fa&abtid
=07&&depid=44&semid=2462]. 
7.3 Iran and the Gulf Countries  
 
Apart from Syria, Iran has extremely bad re-
lations with Arab countries. The Arab and 
Sunni Muslim countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates form together the Coopera-
tion Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(CCASG), and are close allies of the United 
States and the West.  
Since the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
established in 1979, the relations between 
Iran and the CCASG have drastically wors-
ened. Nowadays, they are conflicted due to 
the following reasons:  
 
- The Shiite vs. Sunni conflict, 
- The Iranian nuclear program that causes 
fear in the CCASG countries, 
- The collaboration of the CCASG coun-
tries with the West and especially the 
United States, the worst enemy of Iran, 
- The ownership of oilfields located in the 
Persian Gulf, 
- Territorial disputes over some islands 
between UAE and Iran, 
- CCASG countries’ involvement in Iran’s 
domestic policy, and Iran’s involvement 
in CCASG countries’ domestic policy. 
 
As the leader of the Shiite world, Iran is try-
ing to spread the Shiite religion and is sup-
porting the Shiite minorities in the CCASG 
countries. This works both ways: Saudi 
Arabia, the leader of the CCASG countries, 
is supporting Iranian Sunnis, especially Ba-
lochis and Arabs in Iran. The fact that both 
groups are intervening in each other’s do-
mestic affairs has caused tension, disputes 
and threatening on both sides. The situation 
is especially tense between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, who are fighting on who is the 
leader of the Muslim world. Below, some of 
these factors that are worsening the rela-
tions of Iran and the CCASG countries are 
further clarified.  
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7.3.1 The Conflict between Sunnis and Shiites  
 
Under Prophet Mohammed’s successor 
Ali’s regime around 650 AC, raged a civil 
war in the Arabic Peninsula that eventually 
led to the murder of Ali. The deep conflict 
between the Shiites and Sunnis started pre-
cisely from this murder almost 1,400 years 
ago. 
The history of Islam is full of wars that 
have been fought between the two schools. 
The bloodiest period was between the 
1600s and 1900s, when the Ottoman Em-
pire and the Shiite Safavidi Dynasty cross 
swords. These battles deepened the differ-
ences between the two schools even 
more.87 There is no end in sight for the bat-
tles between Shiites and Sunnis, because 
both camps believe they are right.  
                                                
In Iran, where Shiites are ruling, the 
minority Sunnis can’t express their religion 
freely. Shiite is the only official religion in a 
country where 89% of the population, are 
Shiites.88 Thousands of Sunni activists are 
in prison, and the whole system is discrimi-
native against them. This is actually a quite 
frequent tendency in the Middle East, 
where Sunnis have poor conditions in Shiite 
countries and vice versa. For instance in 
Teheran - a city of 13 million inhabitants 
with thousands of Shiite mosques - Sunnis 
do not have but one mosque for them-
selves.89 In Pakistan and Iraq, dozens of 
people die every day in confrontations be-
tween the two schools.  
 
                                                
87 For more information see the book: F. Dale  
Stephen, “The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, 
Safavids, and Mughals (New Approaches to Asian 
History)”. 
88 World Factbook, 19 March 2013, [https://www.  
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/ir.html]. 
89 Kamali Dehghan Saeed, “Sunni Muslims banned 
from holding own Eid prayers in Tehran”, The 
Guardian, 31 August 2011, [http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/iran-forbids-sunni-
eidprayers]. 
In Sunni countries such as Egypt or 
the CCASG countries, Shiites are not toler-
ated. Especially the Salafist movement in 
the CCASG countries sees Shiites as infi-
dels. In 1987, during the pilgrimage to 
Saudi-Arabia, Iranian pilgrims gathered up 
for a peaceful demonstration, when Saudi 
policeman attacked the crowd opening fire 
and killing hundreds.90 Even though it hap-
pened more than twenty-six years ago, it is a 
good example of the hostility that is today 
still underlying between the two schools. In 
fact, the whole Middle East is divided into 
two camps. 
In the Iraq-Iran war (1980–1988) and 
the current Syrian conflict, this division has 
been clearer than ever. During the Iran-Iraq 
war, Sunni countries Saudi-Arabia and Ku-
wait supported Saddam Hussein against 
Iran, and Shiite countries and groups sup-
ported Iran. The Iraq War of 2003 was ex-
ceptional, because Shiites and Sunnis col-
laborated and formed one front against 
Saddam Hussein.  
In the current conflict of Syria, Sunni 
majority countries like CCASG countries, 
Egypt, Turkey and Lebanon, as well as 
smaller Sunni groups from other countries, 
are supporting the opposition in its efforts 
to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Re-
spectively, Shiite leader Iran and its allies 
such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Jihadist 
groups from Palestine, Iraqi Shiites, Turkish 
Alawites and Shiites from Oman and Bah-
rain are supporting al-Assad’s regime. Most 
of the Western countries support the Sunni 
camp and consider them as their allies. 
China and Russia on the other hand sup-
port the Shiite camp, led by Iran.  
 
 
90 Kifner John, ”400 die as Iranian marchers Saudi  
police in Mecca; embassies smashed in Teheran”, 
The New York Times, 2 August 1987, [http://www. 
ny-times.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-
marchers-battle-saudi-police-meccaembassies-
smashed-teheran.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm]. 
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7.3.2 Iran’s Nuclear Program  
 
The efforts of Iran to acquire the technol-
ogy necessary for the development of nu-
clear weapons has caused great fear in 
CCASG countries. The concern of the 
CCASG countries is awoken especially for 
two reasons. First of all, CCASG countries 
and especially Saudi Arabia do not want to 
see their biggest enemy, Iran, to acquire the 
high technology that is necessary to build a 
nuclear bomb. If this would happen, the in-
fluence Iran has in the region would highly 
increase, and CCASG countries are pre-
pared to do everything it takes to prevent 
this. According to the report of the Atomic 
Kingdom91, if Iran builds a nuclear weapon, 
it will put pressure on Saudi-Arabia to build 
one too.92  
Second of all, the Iranian nuclear 
power plant of Bushehr is located in the 
southwest of the country, near the border 
with the CCASG countries. Bushehr is lo-
cated in a zone that is geographically liable 
to earthquakes, and the big concern is that 
something similar to Japan’s Fukushima 
disaster will take place in Bushehr. If this 
happened, most of the victims will likely be 
inhabitants of the CCASG countries. This 
concern is not unfounded; the earthquake 
of 2012 in Iran caused widespread devasta-
                                                 
                                                
91 “Atomic Kingdom” is a part of a broader project 
at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 
analyzing the consequences of Iranian 
nuclearization. The project examines how the 
United States and its allies should better prevent 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and, should 
these efforts fail, mitigate the consequences of a 
nuclear-armed Iran. CNAS gratefully acknowledges 
the Ploughshares Fund, United States Institute of 
Peace and the Carnegie Corporation of New York 
for their generous financial support. 
92 For more information see the following report: 
H. Kahl Colin, G. Dalton Melissa and Irvine 
Matthew, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi 
Arabia Be Next? Atomic Kingdom”, Atomic 
Kingdom, February 2013, [http://www.cnas.org/ 
files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKing
dom_Kahl.pdf]. 
tion.93 All the CCASG countries have ac-
tively supported the sanctions inflicted 
upon Iran that aim to stop them to further 
develop the technology necessary for build-
ing a nuclear bomb.  
 
7.3.3 Quarrels Over Territories  
 
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb 
have been a territorial dispute between Iran 
and the United Arab Emirates for a long 
time now. Abu Musa and the Greater 
Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs are small islands 
located in the Persian Gulf. Notwithstand-
ing of their small size, they are located stra-
tegically in the middle of the Persian Gulf, 
and they have huge strategic importance to 
what shipping and oil tanker traffic are con-
cerned.94 
At the present, Iran has control of the 
islands. The Federation of American Scien-
tists claims that Iran has built up a military 
presence on the islands that includes anti-
aircraft and anti-ship missiles.95 The UAE 
are unhappy with the situation, claiming 
that Iran has been occupying the islands 
that actually belong to the Emirates. This 
has caused tension between the two coun-
tries; since Iran firmly states the islands be-
long to its territory.  
 
7.3.4 The Cooperation between the CCASG  
        Countries and the West  
 
The alliance between the CCASG countries 
and the United States has irritated Iran and 
 
93 Tafline Lailin, ”Gulf Countries Fear Leaks from  
Iranian Nuclear Plant”, Greenprophet 22 July 2013, 
[http://www.greenprophet.com/2013/07/gulf-
countries-fear-leaks-from-iranian-nuclear-plant/]. 
94 Hilleary Cecily, ”Iran-UAE Island Dispute Could 
Escalate”, Voice of America 18 October 2012,  
[http://www.voanews.com/content/iran-uae-
island-dispute-could-escalate/1528869.html]. 
95 EIA (US Energy Information Administration), 
”World Oil Transit Chokepoints”, 22 August 2012, 
[http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Worl
d_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf]. 
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worsened the relationship between Iran and 
the CCASG countries.96 USA is a major ally 
of the CCASG countries, and one of its key 
tasks is to protect them from any external 
attacks, notably from Iran. In exchange, 
USA gets to buy cheap oil, sell military 
equipment to the countries and supervise 
the safety of oil traffic on the Persian Gulf. 
USA has dozens of military bases in the 
CCASG countries.97 In that way USA can 
be thought to be one of Iran’s “neighbor 
countries”, who has supervising the domes-
tic and foreign affairs within the CCASG 
region, including Iran’s relationship with its 
neighbors. This fact irritates Iran very 
much, but on the other hand it has brought 
some kind of stability to the region, since 
now Iran cannot freely interfere with the 
inner affairs of the CCASG countries.  
As an ally of the USA, Saudi Arabia, 
the leader of the CCASG countries, is also 
indirectly an ally of Israel. It would be ready 
to support any military action that would 
take place against Iran. In addition, Saudi 
Arabia has been supporting the Syrian op-
position. It wants to weaken the Shiite axis 
of the Middle East, and to see a Sunni 
leader step into power in Syria.  
 
7.4 Iran and Turkey 
 
If Iran’s relations with the CCASG coun-
tries are bad, its relations with Turkey are 
somewhat better. Several factors are bring-
ing the two nations closer to each other: 
                                                 
                                                
96 Waezi Mahmoud, Relations between Iran and  
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf (CCASG), Center for Strategic Research 2007, 
[http://www.csr.ir/Pdf/Content2237/Pages%20fro
m%20No.28-shoraye%20khalije%20fars-farsi-
2.pdf]. 
97 Degang Sun, ”The US Military Bases in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council States: Dynamics of 
Readjustment”, Middle East Studies Institute, 
Shanghai International Studies University 2010, 
[http://research.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/13/ad
/24/7fc5a2764fe39852c873b566005f/ba1a738c-
5ac3-4e40-aa80-52603f103057.pdf]. 
common economic interests, political Islam, 
and collaboration against the birth of a 
Kurdish federation.  
However, the relations all but roseate, 
with the Syrian civil war bringing additional 
chill. The relations between Iran and Turkey 
have been negatively influenced by many 
factors:  
 
- The conflict between Shiites and Sunnis, 
- Turkey’s NATO membership and its re-
lations to Israel, 
- Iran’s nuclear program, 
- The Kurdish question in Turkey and 
Iran’s Turkish minority (Azeris), 
- Syria’s civil war.  
 
In the following, some key factors in the 
Iran-Turkey relations are further explained.  
 
7.4.1 Background 
 
Iran and Turkey are both influential coun-
tries in the Middle East. They share a bor-
der of almost 500 km. To this day, the 
bloody battles that were fought between the 
Ottoman Empire’s led by Turkey and the 
Shiite Safavidi Dynasty led by Iran between 
the 1600s and 1900s still have a negative 
impact to the countries’ relations.  
But there is more than that. 20% of the 
Turkish population is Alawites. These peo-
ple have tense relations with the Sunni rul-
ers of Turkey, but good relations with Iran. 
Nationalist and secular governments ruled 
Turkey until the Justice and Development 
party (AKP) stepped into power in 2001. 
Until that, Iran had been supporting 
Islamists in Turkey against the nationalists 
and secular groups and parties, which was 
one thing that influenced the countries’ rela-
tions in a negative way.98  
During the 1990s, the Turkish gov-
ernment wanted to limit the amount of in-
 
98 Makovsky Alan, “How to Deal with Erbakan”,  
Middle East Forum, March 1997, [http://www.me-
forum.org/335/how-to-deal-with-erbakan].  
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teraction between its citizens and Iranians, 
out of fear that Kurdish separatism ideology 
would spread in the country. Iran, much for 
the same reasons, also tried to limit the in-
teractions.  
However, since the AKP party took 
power in 2001, the relations between Tur-
key and Iran have been ameliorating. They 
kept on getting better until the civil war in 
Syria started in 2011. During the past five 
years, Iran and Turkey have actively pro-
moted bilateral investment and trade in 
their shared border regions. This proves 
that the governments are taking steps to 
build better relations between them. Now, 
since the civil war started in Syria, the rela-
tions are no longer warm, but the countries 
keep on maintaining good trade relations 
for the benefice of both countries.99  
 
7.4.2 Turkey’s NATO Membership  
 
Since 1952, Turkey has been a NATO 
member and an ally of the US. In a recent 
statement, the country’s authorities claimed 
that100  
 
Ever since our NATO membership […], the 
North Atlantic Alliance has played a central 
role in Turkey’s security and contributed to its 
integration with the Euro-Atlantic commu-
nity. Turkey, in return, has successfully as-
sumed its responsibilities in defending the 
common values of the Alliance.  
 
Turkey holds its NATO membership and 
companionship with the West very high, as 
this statement demonstrates.  
In Iran’s point of view, Turkey’s 
NATO membership and close connections 
with Israel are irritating. Iran also wants and 
                                                 
                                                
99 Fars-News, “Iran Warns Turkey to Stay Away  
from War on Syria”, 27 August 2013, [Iran Warns 
Turkey to Stay Away from War on Syria]. 
100 Republic of Turkey, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
“Turkey’s Relations with NATO”, 9 August 2013, 
[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa]. 
needs allies; otherwise Turkey would win 
the power battle. Thus, Iran has tightened 
its relations to China and Russia. 
Turkey is worried about Iran’s nuclear 
program and especially about the fact that 
Iran might build a nuclear weapon. If this 
happened, Turkey would interpret it as an 
immense threat.  
During the Syrian conflict, NATO 
moved a missile defense system to Turkey 
for protection in case Syria or some other 
country would attack Turkey.101  Iran per-
ceives the missile defense system as a threat 
and has expressed its concerns over it to the 
Turkish authorities.102 
 
7.4.3 Minority issues 
 
From the 80 million people living in Tur-
key, 20% are ethnic Kurds. Respectively, 
from the 80 million Iranians, 20% are eth-
nically Azeris and Turkmens, which mean 
that they have Turkish roots.103  
Whether it is in Turkey or Iran, both 
minorities’ civil rights are disrespected. Nei-
ther can study in their native language nor 
express their culture freely. Iran aims to 
“Persianize” all of its minorities, and Turkey 
respectively wants to “Turkisize” its Kurd-
ish population.  
For dozens of years, Kurds have been 
fighting the Turkish government alongside 
the Kurdistan’s Workers Party PKK. In 
2013, the Turkish government accepted to 
pursue peace negotiations with the Kurds. 
Both wish to find a way to stop the bloody 
 
101 NATO, ”German, Dutch, Turkish and American 
officials from NATO in Brussels visit Patriot 
deployments”, January 2013, [http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/ en/natolive/news_98936.htm]. 
102 Haaretz, ”Iran warns Turkey against deploying 
NATO missile defense system”, 8 September 2011, 
[http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-
warns-turkey-against-deploying-nato-missile-defen-
se-system-1.383241].  
103 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 9  
August 2013, [https://www.cia.gov/library/publi- 
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html]. 
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battle that has cost more than 40.000 lives 
during dozens of years. In September 2013, 
the negotiations are still taking place and no 
permanent agreement has been reached.104  
The Kurdish question has been a 
source for ongoing confrontation between 
Turkey and Iran. Turkey blames Iran for 
supporting the Turkish Kurds’ separatism 
ideology. In Turkey’s opinion, Iran tries to 
sabotage Turkey’s unity. Ironically, Iran says 
the exact same thing about Turkey. It is a 
fact that some headquarters of the PKK, 
who fights for the rights of the Kurds in 
both countries, lie on Iran’s side of the bor-
der. Turkey sees this as a reason to support 
the Turkish minorities of Iran, providing 
their political parties the possibility to as-
sembly in Turkey and putting pressure on 
Iran to give the Turkish minorities their full 
civil rights.105 Despite their different point 
of views, Iran and Turkey collaborate in 
their anti-Kurdish efforts. However, this is a 
fact that causes friction in their relations. 
 
7.4.4 Iran and Turkey’s Relations and the Syrian  
        Civil War 
 
Iran has had a major role in the Syrian civil 
war. Without the support of Iran, the oppo-
sition forces would probably long ago have 
overthrown al-Assad’s regime. But since 
Iran – alongside many others – keeps fuel-
ling the crisis, it has protracted considerably. 
Here we contemplate the relations between 
Iran and its neighbor Syria.106  
                                                 
                                                
104 Letsch Constanze, “Kurds dare to hope as PKK 
fighters' ceasefire with Turkey takes hold”, Guardian 
7 May 2013, [http://www.theguardian. com/world/ 
2013/ may/07/kurds-pkk-turkey-peace-talks].    
105 Today’s Zaman, “Iranian Azeris set up national 
council in Turkey, aspire for independence”, 14 May 
2012, [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-280353 
-iranian-azeris-set-up-national-council-in-turkey-as-
pire-for-independence.html]. 
106 George Marcus, “Iran's Khamenei warns of U.S. 
loss over intervention in Syria”, Reuters 5 September 
2013, [http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/  
05/us-syria-crisis-iran-idUSBRE9840CQ20130905]. 
As seen in the previous chapter, Syria’s 
civil war has caused the relations between 
Iran and Turkey to deteriorate. Turkey has 
been showing massive support to the oppo-
sition forces. For instance, the headquarters 
of the opposition lay in Turkey’s side of the 
border. International jihadist groups coming 
from several different countries first gather 
in Turkey before entering Syria and the war 
scene to fight in the rows of the opposi-
tion.107 On the other hand, Iran is the big-
gest supporter of Bashar al-Assad’s regime 
– and intends to stay that way. In a recent 
interview, Iran’s newly elected President 
Hassan Rouhani stated that “no force in the 
world would shake the alliance between the two 
countries”.108  
 
7.4.5 Economic Relations 
 
Despite all the discords listed in this chap-
ter, Iran and Turkey maintain good eco-
nomic relations. Turkey is one of the big-
gest buyers of Iranian oil and gas. For Iran, 
these purchases are more and more valu-
able, since the economic situation of the 
country keeps on getting worse due to in-
ternational sanctions. Iran is not only in a 
sellers role; each year, more and more Irani-
ans choose to spend their holidays in Tur-
key, bringing money to the country’s tour-
ism industry.  
The U.S., who has been one of the 
most eager countries to inflict sanctions 
upon Iran, is not pleased about the trade 
that is taking place between the two nations. 
It has threatened its good partner Turkey 
with limited access to the U.S. market if 
 
107 Alkac Firat, ”Al-Qaeda Militants Travel To Syria 
Via Turkey”, Almonitor 23 July 2013, [http://www. 
al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/07/al-qaeda-
militants-syria-turkey-border.html].  
108 Fox news, " Iran's new president vows support  
for Assad regime”, Associated Press 5 August 2013, 
[http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/04/ira
n-new-president-says-no-force-in-world-will-shake-
tehran-alliance-with-syria/]. 
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Turkey do not stop trading with Iran. So 
far, the threats have led to no action.     
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan form a trade 
union called Economic Cooperation Or-
ganization (ECO)109 that has been trying to 
facilitate trade between them for decades 
now.  
All the factors presented in this chapter 
influence the relations between Iran and 
Turkey. Right now there are less binding 
factors than there are divisional ones. Iran 
has a difficult time accepting that it is 
neighbors with a NATO membership coun-
try that is an ally with all its enemies. On the 
other hand, Turkey will not accept Iran to 
become a nuclear power. These factors will 
keep on chilling their relations, until power 
and the whole political system has been 
changed in Iran. 
 
7.5 Iran and Azerbaijan  
 
Iran and Azerbaijan are culturally close but 
ideologically very far apart. Azerbaijan tries 
to maintain good relations to the West and 
wants to act itself as one of the Western 
counties. This irritates the Iranian regime, 
since it would like all countries to be Is-
lamic. The fact that Azerbaijan once be-
longed to Iran only makes the ideological 
differences more irritating for Iran.  
The majority of the Azerbaijanis peo-
ple are Muslims and belong to the Shiite 
branch. The government, however, is secu-
lar. Ideologically, the Azerbaijanis identify 
with Turkey. This identification is stronger 
for the Azerbaijanis than the identification 
with the Islamic community. They are in 
                                                 
                                                
109 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), is 
an intergovernmental regional organization 
established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for 
the purpose of promoting economic, technical and 
cultural cooperation among the Member States. 
ECO is the successor organization of Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD) which 
remained in existence since 1964 up to 1979. 
[http://www.ecosecretariat.org/]. 
 
fact part of the Pan-Turkism movement, 
which Iran finds worrying. 110 
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991, Iran strove to support the Caucasian 
countries, especially Azerbaijan.111  But in-
stead of reaching towards Russia and Iran 
for support, Azerbaijan established relations 
with the West, Turkey and Israel. Now, the 
two biggest trading partners for Azerbaijan 
are Turkey and Israel. As for Iran, it views 
the relationship between Azerbaijan and Is-
rael as a threat.   
Israel has been among Azerbaijan's top 
five trade partners in recent years. Baku is 
Israel's top oil supplier, providing around 40 
percent of its annual consumption, while Is-
rael is the sixth highest importer of Azerbai-
jani oil exports.112 Israel purchases oil and 
gas from Azerbaijan, and sells military 
equipment such as arms to the country. Is-
rael has also trained the army of Azerbaijan. 
In the conflict between Armenia and Azer-
baijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh land, Is-
rael is supporting Azerbaijan.113 
As the high-ranking official in Azerbai-
jan’s President’s Ilham Aliyev’s administra-
tion put it, “Iran wants Azerbaijan to be-
come friends with its friends, and enemies 
with its enemies”. He also stated that Azer-
baijan will keep on forming its relation in 
the framework of the country’s own inter-
ests, not at all in regards to what Iran has in 
 
110 Panorama, “Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan: 
Turkey spreading pan-Turkism”, 11 February 2013, 
[http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2013/02/1
1/ambassador-iran-azerbaijan/]. 
111 Kotecha Hema, “Islamic and Ethnic Identities in 
Azerbaijan: Emerging trends and tensions, 
Development Researcher – Anthropologist 2006, 
[http://www.osce.org/baku/23809]. 
112 Shaffer Brenda, “Azerbaijan's Cooperation with 
Israel Goes Beyond Iran Tensions”, Washington 
Institute 16 April 2013, [http://www.washing-
tonins-titute.org/policy-analysis/view/azerbaijans-
coope-ration-with-israel-goes-beyond-iran-tensions]. 
113 Ter-Sahakyan Karine,  “Armenia has no place in 
triumvirate Israel-Turkey-Azerbaijan”, 15 April 
2011, [http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/details/  
67325/]. 
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mind.114 According to Grove Thomas’ re-
port for Reuters, if Israel was to attack Iran, 
Azerbaijan would allow Israel to use its air-
space, air bases and spy drones to help Is-
rael fight Iran.115  
The interfering of both countries to 
each other’s internal affairs has definitely 
worsened their relations. Iran supports the 
Shiite groups of Azerbaijan who are fighting 
against the government. Reciprocally, the 
Azerbaijani government supports Iran’s Az-
eris who are also fighting for their rights in 
Iran. In 2012, the Azerbaijan parliament 
discussed the possibility of changing the 
name of the country from Republic of 
Azerbaijan to Northern Azerbaijan.116 In 
the same time, they started to urge the Ira-
nian Azeris to strive to gain independence, 
with the idea that this area would be called 
Southern Azerbaijan once detached from 
Iran. In response, the Iranian member of 
parliament Kamal Aladeen Firmouza under-
lined the need for a referendum, where Ira-
nians could vote for the returning the coun-
try of Azerbaijan to Iran. He claimed that 
“there is a real desire and interest among 
Azerbaijani citizens to rejoin Iran”.117 Azer-
baijan was part of Iran until it was annexed 
to Russia in the Russo-Persian War of 1826-
1828.118 
                                                 
                                                
114 Resneck Jacob and Guluyev Zaka, “Azerbaijan’s 
tense ties with neighbor Iran cause concern”, The 
Washington Times 25 May 2012, [http://www.wash- 
ingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/25/azerbaijans-
tense-ties-neighbor-iran-cause-concern/?page=all]. 
115 Grove Thomas,”Azerbaijan eyes aiding Israel 
against Iran”, Reuters 30 September 2012, [http://  
www.reu-ters.com/article/2012/09/30/us-iran-
israel-azerbai-jan-idUSBRE88T05L20120930]. 
116 Giorgi Lomsadze, ” Will Azerbaijan Change Its  
Name?”, 2 February 2012, [http://www.eurasianet. 
org/node/64942]. 
117 Irandailybrief, “Majlis member calls for referen-
dum on return of Azerbaijan to”, 8 April 2013, 
[http://www.irandailybrief.com/2013/04/08/majlis
-member-calls-for-referendum-on-return-of-azer-
baijan-to-iran/]. 
118 Islamic Revulution Document Center The Treaty 
of Turkmenchay, 2013, [http://www.irdc.ir/en/  
default.aspx]. 
The relations between Iran and Azer-
baijan are heading to a worsening direction. 
Both countries keep on interfering in each 
other’s business, and the warming relations 
between Israel and Azerbaijan, especially 
regarding military affairs, gravely irritates 
Iran. On the other hand, the influence of 
Iran, Armenia and Russia in the former So-
viet Union countries, especially in Caucasus, 
is increasing.  
 
7.6 Iran and Iraq  
 
The Iran-Iraq border is almost 1.500 km 
long from the Shatt al-Arab (known as Ar-
vand Rud in Iran) waterway to the Turkish 
border. Culturally, the two countries are not 
far apart from each other. For instance, the 
best-known cultural heritage sites of Shiite 
Muslims are scattered on both sides of the 
border. At the present moment, both coun-
tries are ruled by Shiites. This has led to 
warmer relations than ever before, and now 
these two oil-rich countries are close trade 
partners.   
In the following, we contemplate the 
relation between Iran and Iraq. 
 
 
7.6.1 Relations Under Saddam Hussein’s Regime   
 
Until 2003 and the collapse of Saddam Hus-
sein’s regime, the relations between Iran 
and Iraq were bad. The Iran-Iraq War 
(1980–1988), which lasted for almost eight 
years, was one of the bloodiest conflicts of 
the century with more than a million killed 
and a million wounded on both sides. 
Chemical weapons were used against civil-
ians and the army.  
Although there were many reasons why 
the war started119, the most important mo-
 
119 Another reason for the eruption of the Iran-Iraq 
war was the conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. 
Khomeini stated that every country should follow 
Iran’s example of the Islamic revolution. His 
statements such as “we shall confront the world 
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tives are considered to be a border conflict 
and a conflict between two different ideolo-
gies.120 Even though the war ended in 1988, 
the conflict between the two countries did 
not cease then. Both kept on interfering in 
each other’s internal affairs, and kept on 
supporting the opposition in the rival coun-
try until 2003, when the U.S. troops and 
their allies attacked Iraq and overthrew 
Saddam Hussein’s regime.121  
                                                                            
with our ideology and “we shall spread Islam 
everywhere in the world” evoked fear everywhere in 
the world, especially in the countries ruled by 
Sunnis. These countries were mostly allies of the 
West.  The historical reasons stated above, the wor-
rying speeches Khomeini made and the support 
Iran showed to the Iraqi Shiites (that formed 60% 
of the Iraqi population but had bad relations with 
the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein) were the three 
reasons that drove Saddam Hussein to attack Iran. 
The war lasted eight years, causing many thousand 
casualties in both sides. Actually, Saddam Hussein 
was ready to start peace negotiations after one year 
of warfare, but at this point Khomeini was 
determined to keep on going until Saddam Hussein 
would be out of the picture, and he would be free to 
mold Iraq into a Shiite state. However, the war kept 
going for so long that Khomeini had no choice but 
to accept the UN’s peace treaty. The war ended, and 
Iraq wasn’t turned into a Shiite nation.  
120 The Iran-Iraq War’s roots go back to the era of 
the Persian and Ottoman Empires; when a peace 
and border agreement was signed between these 
two empires in 1639 but the border disputes 
exploded again in 1818 and another agreement was 
signed in 1823. After Britain and Russia intervened 
in 1837, another border agreement was also signed. 
In the Twentieth Century, the dispute centered 
around the Shatt Al Arab River. The river forms the 
border between Iraq and Iran until it empties into 
the Arabian Gulf. The Shatt and the region around 
it have strategic and economic importance for both 
countries, but particularly for Iraq since it is Iraq's 
principle maritime window to the world.  
121 For more information about the Iraqi War see 
article: Wong Leonard & A. Kolditz Thomas & A. 
Millen Raymond & M. Potter Terrence, “Why the 
fight: combat motivation in the Iraq War”, SSI, 
Strategic Studies Institute (United States Army War 
College), July 2003, [http://www.strategicstudiesins-
titute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub179.pdf]. 
In the Iraq war, Iran showed some 
support to its enemy the U.S. for several 
reasons: 
 
- They had a common enemy. As is said 
”My enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Sad-
dam Hussein was an enemy to both U.S. 
and Iran, and both countries contrib-
uted to his overthrowing. Iran wasn’t 
able to overthrow him, despite having 
tried to do it for eight years under the 
Iran-Iraq war. But now U.S. did what 
both countries had been trying to do, 
and put an end to Hussein’s regime.  
- Iran was afraid U.S. would attack it. Iran 
wants to contradict or stand in the way 
of U.S. attacking Iraq also because it was 
afraid that if that was the case, U.S. 
could attack Iran after it had finished its 
business in Iraq.   
- Iran did not stand in the way of the col-
laboration between U.S. and the Iraqi 
opposition. During the Iraq war, most 
of the influential Iraqis and the coun-
tries opposition had their headquarters 
in Iran.  The Iraqi opposition had a ma-
jor role in helping the U.S. overthrow 
Saddam Hussein.  
- Iran had a collaborative role in the stabi-
lization process of Iraq after the war was 
over. First, right after Saddam was over-
thrown, Iran tried to interfere in the in-
ternal affairs of Iraq and support the 
Shiites in the country. Quickly, it 
adopted a different attitude and started 
– out of fear – to collaborate with the 
U.S. in efforts to bring stability to the 
country.  
 
Since the Iraqi dictator was overthrown, a 
new phase has begun in the relations be-
tween Iraq and Iran. Now the two consider 
each other as allies.  In this way, Iran bene-
fited massively from the Iraq war, gaining 
good relationship with a neighbor it had 
had bad relations in the past with.  
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After Turkey, Iran is the second most 
important trade partner for Iraq. Iran ex-
ports massively to Iraq, and tries in this way 
to go round the sanctions the international 
community has inflicted upon it. 
Iran has good relations with the Iraqi 
Shiite parties. Through them, Iran has been 
able to suffocate the Sunnis of Iraq and to 
control the Iraqi opposition groups, whose 
headquarters were located in Iran. The Ira-
nian Quds army finances and trains the Shi-
ite militants of Iraq.122 Through them, Iran 
gets to have some influence and authority in 
Iraq. Iran has also used the Shiite militants 
to attack the most well known opposition 
group MEK’s (Mujahidin-e-Khalq) head-
quarters, killing dozens of its supporters.123 
Iran has been able to influence Iraq’s 
foreign and domestic policies in all possible 
areas. Iran had a major role in composing 
the Iraqi government and choosing the key 
authorities, such as the president and prime 
minister. Nowadays, it is almost impossible 
for Iraqi politicians to work independently 
without Iran interfering.  
 
7.6.2 The Iraqi Sunnis Are Discontented 
 
The Sunnis and secular people of Iraq feel 
like Iran is conquering Iraq, pretty much 
like the U.S. did. The Sunnis of Iraq have 
protested several times against Iran interfer-
ing in the country’s domestic affairs. For in-
stance, in December 2012, the city of Fal-
luja, Iraqi Sunni protesters set fire to the 
flag of Iran, shouting “out, out Iran! Bagh-
dad stays free” and “Maliki you coward, do 
not take your advice from Iran”.124  
                                                 
                                                                           
122 Fantz Ashley, “What is the Quds Force?”, CNN  
11 October 2011, [http://security.blogs.cnn.com/  
2011/10/11/what-is-the-quds-force/]. 
123 Reuters, ”Mortar attack on Iranian dissident camp  
in Iraq kills three”, 15 June 2013, [http://www.  
reuters.com/article/2013/06/15/us-iraq-mek-
idUSBRE95E0HO20130615].  
124 Naama Kamal and Salman Raheem, “Thousands 
of Iraq’s Sunnis demonstrate against PM Maliki”, 28 
The chaotic situation and daily bomb 
explosions in Iraq are due to the discon-
tentment of the Sunnis. Under Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, the Sunnis were ruling as 
a minority the whole country, Kurds and 
Shiites included. But now, Sunnis are ruling 
only the Sunni territories of Iraq, which 
make them unhappy with the current situa-
tion.  
Many125 claim that it was a mistake for 
the U.S. to attack Iraq.126 They say that the 
war has been claiming far too many lives 
and has cost a fortune, while Iraq is in a 
state of complete chaos and has not stabi-
lized.127 However, some feel that despite 
the current problems Iraq is facing, the U.S. 
intervention of 2003 brought many positive 
elements.128 They justify their claims with 
the following129: 
 
- Overthrowing Saddam brought peace to 
these ally countries, who now maintain 
good relations with the current Iraqi re-
gime. The Iraqi dictator was a threat to 
the allies of the West in the Middle East. 
For instance, Hussein conquered Ku-
 
December 2012, [http://www.alarabiya.net/artic-
les/2012/12/28/257459.html]. 
125 Thompson Loren, “Iraq: The Biggest Mistake In 
American Military History”, Forbes 15 December 
2011, [http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthomp-
son/2011/12/15/the-biggest-mistake-in-american-
military-history/]. 
126 Blix Hans, “Hans Blix: Iraq War was a terrible 
mistake and violation of U.N. charter”, CNN 19 
March 2013, [http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/18/  
opinion/iraq-war-hans-blix/index.html]. 
127 Nowicki Dan, ”10 years later, many see Iraq War 
as costly mistake”, USATODAY 17 March 2013,  
[http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/20
13/03/17/iraq-war-10-years-later/1993431/]. 
128 Hanson Victor Davis, “Why Did We Invade 
Iraq?”, 26 March 2013, [http://www.nationalre- 
view.com/articles/343870/why-did-we-invade-iraq-
victor-davis-hanson]. 
129 The Washington Post, [Transcript: President  
Bush and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani], 13 
September 2005, [http://www.washingtonpost.com  
/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091 
300906.html]. 
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wait, a U.S. ally, and was a dangerous 
threat to the Arab States of the Gulf 
(CCASG).  
- After Saddam was overthrown, funda-
mentalist Islamic groups lost their big-
gest supporter. Iraq under Saddam’s re-
gime was the most important supporter 
of the al-Qaida and different terrorist 
groups.  Now they have to deal with the 
U.S. and the Iraqi army fighting against 
them.  
- Overthrowing a dictator who has been 
involved in the murdering of thousands 
of Iraqis has provided the Iraqis with 
the opportunity to establish democracy 
in their country. Nowadays the different 
ethnic and religious groups of Iraq are 
ruling the country together. Even 
though it is not working so well, this 
would have been completely unimagin-
able in Saddam’s time. Now Shiites are 
ruling over Shiite territories, Sunnis over 
Sunni territories and Kurds over Kurd-
ish territories. If they all found a com-
mon melody, Iraq could become an ex-
ample to follow for the other Middle-
Eastern countries.  
 
At present, the system in Iraq is divided 
into three. Shiites have good relations with 
Iran and bad relations with Sunni countries. 
Sunni Arab nationalist groups have good re-
lations with Sunni countries and very bad 
relations with Iran. The North-Iraqi Kurd-
ish area is more democratic and secular than 
the rest of the country. This is despite the 
fact that Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish 
Federation, is actually fighting his own 
clan’s case, not those of the Kurdish popu-
lation.130 He wants to implement a similar 
political system than in the Gulf countries, 
where only his family members can have 
                                                 
                                                
130 Rubin Michael, “Dictatorship or Democracy in  
Iraqi Kurdistan?”, 18 May 2010, [http://www. 
micha-elrubin.org/7407/dictatorship-or-democ-
racy-in-iraqi-kurdistan]. 
access to power.131  Barzani has good rela-
tions with Iran as well as the Sunni coun-
tries. However, he is been collaborating 
with Turkey and Iran to fight against the 
Kurdish population in those countries, 
which has gravely irritated the Kurdish 
population.132  
 
7.6.3 The U.S. Is Not Happy About the  
         Warm Relations Between Iran and Iraq 
 
Despite the conflict on the borderline and 
the pressure the U.S. puts, Iran and Iraq’s 
political and economic relations keep on 
ameliorating. This irritates the USA that 
now hopes that the Iraqi government will 
cut its relations with Iran or at least dimin-
ish them, as well as the influence Iran has in 
the country. However, it is very unlikely 
that U.S. could get the relations to deterio-
rate, at least as long as the Shiites are ruling 
the country. Iraq is now part of the Shiite 
axis, which ideological leader is Iran. Iraq 
supports Shiite groups in Lebanon and 
Syria.  
Yet, Iraq is not a unitary country. The 
Iraqi Kurds have their own federation, 
which is like a state within a state. The lead-
ers of the wealthy Kurdish federation do 
not comply with the legislation of Iraq’s 
central government. They maintain good re-
lations with the West. Through the Kurdish 
Federation, the U.S. and other Western 
countries are able to have a non-military 
presence in the country, and in some way to 
reduce Iran’s influence over Iraq.   
 
 
131 Abdulla Mufid, ”Barzani’s latest move to dicta- 
torship”, Kurdistantribune 2 July 2013, [http://kur-
distantribune.com/2013/barzanis-latest-move-dic-
tatorship/]. 
132 Rubin Michael, “Is Barzani really a nationalist?”, 
8 November 2012, [http://kurdistantribune.com/  
2012/barzani-really-nationalist-redux/].  
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Conclusion 
 
In almost every country of the Middle-East 
and North-Africa region, historically as well 
as in the present times, there are three sys-
tems of government that prevail: the theo-
cratic, securocratic, or monarchic system (or 
often some kind of mixture of these). When 
a system is changed, the new system almost 
invariably also belongs to one of these three 
categories.  
For instance in Iran, the monarchic 
system was changed for a theocratic and se-
curocratic system. In Saudi-Arabia, a mix-
ture of the theocratic, monarchic and secu-
rocratic systems prevails. In Egypt, Syria, 
Algeria, Azerbaijan and Libya, the system is 
securocratic. As for the Persian Gulf coun-
tries, Jordan and Morocco, the ruling sys-
tem is monarchic and securocratic. In the 
Middle East and North Africa region, a de-
mocratic system is a strange notion and al-
most unknown system of government so 
far. The implementation of democratic sys-
tems has until now never succeeded, not-
withstanding the fact that that has been the 
peoples’ ambition.    
So why does it seem impossible to see 
a democratic state in the Middle East or 
North Africa (Israel being an exception)? 
After the World War I, the Western winners 
of the war drew the borderlines of most of 
the Middle-East region, dividing and mixing 
different ethnicities and religious groups to-
gether. They supported different ethnicities 
and religious groups against each other, as a 
part of their “divide and rule” policy. In-
stead of supporting democracy, the Great 
Powers have been supporting theocratic, 
monarchic and securocratic systems of go-
vernment.  
The Great Powers are aware that these 
forms of government do not have the peo-
ple’s support – that makes the rulers de-
pendent of them. The Great Power’s sup-
port for the ruler does not come for free. In 
exchange, they get cheap access to natural 
resources and get to direct and control their 
foreign policies. In this game, the Great 
Powers and undemocratic rulers are win-
ners, while the people and democratic prin-
ciples are losers.  
The best way to bring peace and stability 
to the Middle-East, North-Africa, or any 
developing country, would be through these 
principles: 
 
- To stop supporting and selling arms to 
dictators and securocratic, monarchic 
and/or theocratic governments, 
- Instead, focusing on supporting the 
forming of confederation political sys-
tems133 in the region, 
- Supporting the pro-democracy organiza-
tions in the region, and trying to spread 
the model of Western democracy, i.e. by 
trying to export the model of North-
European welfare states (this would ob-
viously be a long process stretching over 
many decades). 
 
Since the Great Powers benefit from the 
Middle-East region not being stable, it is no 
wonder many feel no real change is possible 
until the Great Powers also adopt a new at-
titude.  
Ever since 1980, the Iranians have tried 
many times to overthrow the current ruling 
system, and protested against it, without be-
ing able to catalyze change. In the massive 
demonstrations of 2009, hundreds were 
killed by the government, and many other 
protests have been smothered as well. 
Barack Obama recently claimed that the 
Arab Spring begun in Iran, but it died down 
because the foreign powers did not show 
                                                 
133 A confederation governing system is a political 
system where its constituents decide to delegate 
some powers to a central governing body. Usually it 
is limited to certain specific policies, like foreign 
affairs or military co-operation. One of the features 
of a confederation is that a participating state has a 
right to withdraw from a confederation. 
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any support.134 Many Iranians also feel that 
”Arab spring” in their country would be 
almost impossible without the help of for-
eign powers. 
Building nuclear weapons, violations 
against human rights, supporting terrorism, 
the international community’s sanctions, 
and the bad relations Iran has with most of 
the foreign powers – these are five signs 
that indicate that the “Iranian Spring” is 
dawning. Can Iranians change their political 
regime by themselves, or will they need in-
ternational help?135 
According to some experts, if the 
power system is changed in Iran, peace is 
likely to prevail in the Middle-East, since 
there would be no one left to support Is-
lamic extreme-right parties, Hezbollah, or 
the Syrian regime, nor to threaten Israel and 
the Persian Gulf countries.136  
 
 
                                                 
134 Obama Addresses 'Arab Spring' In Keynote 
Speech, Radio Farda, 2 September 2013,  
[http://www.radiofarda.com/content/o2_obama_s
peech_on_middel_east/24180208.html]. 
135 For more information, see chapter “7. Iranian  
foreign policy” of this document. 
136 Farwick Dieter, ” Iran's Ex-President Banisadr: 
"People want Regime Change", 18 February 2010,  
[http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Iran/diete
r-farwick-1/Irans-Ex-President-Banisadr-People-
want-Regime-Change]. 
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